

## *Chapter 5*

# **Political and economic governance in Africa**

This chapter assesses the governance trends affecting Africa's economic outlook by examining the most recent metrics on the functioning of African public institutions. It looks at how the quality of public service delivery and the performance of institutions meet citizens' expectations. It also lays out the improvements citizens are asking for and how governments are responding. Finally, the chapter outlines the prospects for 2016. Key findings are presented first, and details of how these findings were arrived at are provided in subsequent sections.

## In brief

While employment has been the main concern for Africans over the last decade, demands for better services and infrastructure have been on the rise since 2008, and worries about terrorism and violence are less and less confined to conflict zones. Not only are African countries reforming their public institutions, they are also taking their business environments seriously, which can yield economic dividends over the long term but typically has limited impact in the short term. Some indicators and expert reports hint at improvements in rules and regulations affecting businesses.

The severity and geographic scope of politically motivated violence in the form of terrorism or communalism has been increasing in Africa over the past few years. This has spurred African countries to work together to find regional solutions, but international co-operation is difficult.

African citizenries are increasingly becoming effective at demanding and obtaining improvements in governance. Success stories include the Nobel-prize winning institutions of Tunisia that managed to create a freer and more democratic society as well as new forms of civil oversight in some countries to give citizens other ways to influence policy beyond voting and protesting.

## Key governance challenges in Africa are a growing demand for public services, the threats of terrorism and internal conflicts

This chapter defines governance as the way different state and non-state actors make public decisions and manage economic and social resources for development. State entities, political parties, civil society organisations and private sector actors all play a role in the process. The chapter provides an overview of what the latest data available tells us about governance in Africa, current trends and how this relates to overall development outcomes.

As governance is multi-dimensional, a variety of measures and indicators are considered. These can be divided into four main areas:


- the provision of public goods and services through good management and optimisation of financial resources
- the regulation of economic institutions and the state's effectiveness in fostering economic activity
- the interaction of political institutions with citizens
- the construction of trusted institutions capable of strengthening social cohesion.

Citizens' expectations towards governments and key areas of tensions are the starting point of this chapter. This section presents the main results of opinion polls and surveys, as well as findings from updates of the *African Economic Outlook* (AEO) civil tension indicators.

### Opinion surveys show that citizens demand better economic opportunities, as well as better governance of public institutions


The main issues stressed by African respondents to polls are better public services, better institutions and better job opportunities. The MyWorld 2015 survey by the UN highlights good education, better healthcare and an "honest and responsive government" as the top three priorities for Africans (Figure 5.1). These are followed by the desire for better job opportunities and better access to public infrastructure such as clean water, sanitation and roads.

Figure 5.1. Top priorities for African citizens



Note: This graph represents the answers to the question: “What are the six most important issues for you and your family?” (35 310 respondents in all 54 African countries).

Source: UN/ODI/Ipsos MORI (2016).

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Other opinion surveys show similar results. The Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2014/15 found that the three most important problems that Africans in general want their government to address are unemployment (32.4%), health (29.8%) and education (24%), while rural Africans see better electricity and roads as a first priority. The 2015 Pew global survey, which includes nine African countries, also found that top concerns were employment, healthcare and education (Pew Research Center, 2015).

Employment has been the most pressing issue for African citizens throughout the 2000s, according to Afrobarometer surveys, but demand for better services and infrastructure has been on the rise since 2008. For instance, results from this survey over the years show that demand for better education, health, electricity, transportation, water supply and sanitation is rising. In the survey round of 2002/03, nearly 65% of respondents cited concerns about jobs and income as one of their three biggest concerns. The same poll conducted in 2014/15 showed this number had declined to 54% as respondents increasingly cited services and infrastructure issues. Respondents in 13 countries now cite infrastructure as their most pressing problem (Leo et al., 2015).

Major concerns diverge in some countries. Outliers include Nigeria, which is facing the Boko Haram insurgency, and South Africa, which has a high urban crime rate. Nearly one third of respondents cited insecurity as a major national problem. In Egypt and Tunisia – two countries that underwent regime change during the Arab Spring – and Burundi and Mali – two post-conflict states – concerns about security and crime were cited as the second most frequent issue after jobs and income. Problems related to food security appeared among the top three issues in only two countries of the Sahel region, Niger and Mali. Affordable access to housing was at the top of the list of concerns in the Afrobarometer survey in three of the wealthier African countries: Algeria, Egypt and South Africa.

Regarding political institutions, citizens are demanding fairer and more competitive elections. Elections are common practice in most African countries, and citizens want them to be more competitive and inclusive. A large proportion of African citizens believe that elections are a good principle for good governance, but a much lower proportion feel that electoral processes in their countries are honest (Gallup, 2012-13). Africans increasingly demand good governance outcomes: In 32 African countries out of 34 countries, the majority of citizens preferred democracy to “other kinds of government” in the 2011-13 Afrobarometer survey (Bratton and Houessou, 2014). On

average, this index of demand for democracy was at 71% in 2012. In 16 countries, the scores ranged between 74% in Burundi and 90% in Zambia (many West African countries appear in this list of 16 countries). And citizens surveyed see elections as the best sign of a democratic regime.

Afrobarometer data shows that higher levels of freedom of speech and information are associated with a higher rating of government performance and trust, notably in the fight against corruption. A solid majority of 69% of citizens support the role of media in oversight of governments (Mitullah and Kamau, 2013).

### Public protests are mainly related to jobs, public services and political disagreements

Looking at a variety of metrics is necessary to improve our understanding of citizens' expectations of governments and other public institutions. Opinion surveys, as described above, and the results of elections are among the best indicators available. However, tracking various forms of public protest and the reaction to them provides an additional indication of the extent to which these opinions and motivations are strong enough to inspire action. Interpreting the variations in civil tension indices requires great care: while they may have economic costs, more frequent demonstrations and strikes may also reflect the maturation of increasingly open governance systems. Following the 2011 regime change in Egypt, constitutional changes were accompanied by riots and protests, undermining the Egyptian economy (Masry, 2015). In South Africa, a five-month-long strike in the mining sector cost about ZAR 12 million in 2014 and is estimated to have knocked off about two percentage points from GDP growth in the first quarter of 2015 (OECD, 2015a). The strike – the most costly in South African history – did not result in substantially higher wages (SARB, 2014). The AEO governance indicators presented in this section help gauge the trends in public protests and their motivations (Box 5.1).

#### Box 5.1. Assessing the quality of governance

A key to understanding Africa's growth story over the last decade is assessing the quality of governance. Both economic theory and some cross-country comparisons suggest governance is a key factor in economic development, and it correlates with faster growth, higher investment and increased poverty reduction (ADB, 2013).


Synthesising measures of different aspects of governance into a single evaluation is challenging because the concept of governance is broad (Rhodes, 2012). It is difficult to capture with existing data and often without uniform benchmarks to guide policy (Lin and Monga, 2012; Whaites et al., 2015). Academic debates and empirical work has led to many competing indicators of good governance being proposed. These indicators can be divided into two main types: perception-based measures and fact-based measures. Where information seems to be lacking the most is in fact-based measures (ADB, 2013; The Effective Institutions Platform, 2015).

The **AEO governance indicators** are a fact-based measure of governance evaluating the quality of the interactions between governments, other political institutions and citizens. They track when African citizens are unsatisfied enough with institutions to take public action and how African institutions respond to this discontent. Public protests, which are defined as strikes or any type of demonstration with political, economic or social motives, are tracked on a daily basis via news reports by journalists and press agencies across Africa and verified by AFP and Reuters. By contrast with other forms of civil tensions – including violence, inter-community conflicts and terrorist acts against populations – which are also monitored, public protests represent a democratic way of voicing demands. Each relevant event is counted and then weighted based on such factors as intensity, duration, number of casualties, etc. The methodology is presented in the Statistical Annex of this report.

Public protests took a sharp downturn in 2015, following a steady rise since 2010 (Figure 5.2). Ebola in West Africa and terrorist attacks in several countries led to reduced tolerance for public demonstrations by authorities. Temporary bans or restrictions were

imposed on rallies in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and in the context of officially declared states of emergency<sup>1</sup> in Chad, Egypt, Mali, Niger and Tunisia. Protests in South Africa and Gabon declined in duration and intensity compared with 2014. Finally, North African countries witnessed a decrease overall in the level of protests compared with 2014.

Figure 5.2. Index of public protests in Africa, 1996-2015




Note: Public protests refer to strikes and any demonstration with political, economic or social motives. Each event is weighted by its intensity (number of protesters) and duration (number of weeks). See more details in the methodological annex of the report.

Source: Authors' calculations based on news reports by journalists and press agencies across Africa, verified by AFP and Reuters.

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The top motivations for public protests in Africa from 2013-15, as reported by newswires, tend to be poor economic conditions and public services. Although there are slight differences between the results of opinion polls and the motivations behind various protests across Africa, some convergence appears on economic issues and on issues of political fairness. The top motivations for public protests continue to be demands for wage increases, followed by demands for a change of government and better working conditions (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3. Top drivers of public protests in Africa, 2013-15



Note: Public protests refers to strikes and any demonstration with political, economic or social motives. Each event is weighted by its intensity (number of protesters) and duration (number of weeks). See more details in the methodological annex of the report.

Source: Authors' calculations based on news reports by journalists and press agencies across Africa, verified by AFP and Reuters.

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There were significant differences between major cities and the rest of the country in terms of the types of protests. Protests and civil unrest may be localised or affect the entire country. In general, there seemed to be more economic protests in rural areas and more political protests in urban areas (Map 5.1). These results should nevertheless be interpreted with care since the lines between rural/urban and political/economic motives may sometimes be blurred.

Map 5.1. Intensity of protests in Africa by location, 2015



*Note:* The size of the bubbles represents the intensity of public protests in 2015 (e.g. the number of protests weighted by the number of protesters and duration). See more details in the methodological annex of the report.  
*Source:* Authors' calculations based on news reports by journalists and press agencies across Africa, verified by AFP and Reuters.

### Terrorism represents a growing share of violence by non-state actors


Like in other parts of the world, terrorism has been a growing factor of violence in Africa in recent years, causing long-term social and economic damage in addition to immediate injury, death and destruction. The full negative impact of terrorist attacks and cross-border violence on social progress is not easily assessed. Nevertheless, reports by international organisations in West Africa, for example, provide some evidence of the extent to which the Boko Haram insurgency has been degrading the security situation in Nigeria and the areas neighbouring Lake Chad. Attacks resulted in more than

15 000 dead and have displaced more than 2.1 million people across Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger since 2009, according to the International Organization for Migration. Within the first three months of 2015, more than 1 000 civilians were killed. In Nigeria alone, approximately 600 teachers have been killed since the start of the Boko Haram insurgency to December 2015. Over 2 000 schools remain closed – some of them for more than a year. In addition, hundreds of schools have been attacked, looted or set on fire. More than 1 million children aged 7 to 15 in the region are out of school, of which 380 000 left school within four years, putting them at high risk of dropping out altogether (UNICEF, 2015a).

Looking at the broad trends, the extent and intensity of tracked acts of violence by non-state actors slightly increased in 2015 in Africa (Figure 5.4). The Global Peace Index (GPI) 2015 shows that on average the world became slightly less peaceful, with scores deteriorating in 86 countries, 21 of which were in Africa. Libya experienced the largest decline in peacefulness scores worldwide, as activities by criminal networks and jihadist groups increased (IEP, 2015). The Horn of Africa is also under the threat of terrorism, notably Kenya and Somalia, with multiple attacks by Al-Shabaab terrorists not only against government forces and symbols of power but also against civilians. The attack on the University of Garissa in Kenya in April 2015 left 147 dead.


Inter-community tensions have also been contributing to this increase. For example, in **Kenya**, acts of terror committed by Al-Shabaab led to inter-community mistrust in 2015. Tensions directed towards Kenyan Somalis have risen as a result. In **South Africa**, a wave of unrest targeting foreign-owned shops, mainly in Durban and Johannesburg, resulted in seven dead in April 2015 before government forces took control of the situation.

Figure 5.4. Political hardening and civil violence, 1996-2015




Note: Each violent act has been weighted by its intensity (number of deaths and/or injured people) according to a scaling methodology detailed in the annex of this report.

Source: Authors' calculations based on news reports by journalists and press agencies across Africa, verified by AFP and Reuters.

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Over 2013-15, the three major drivers of violence by non-state actors were: i) terrorism; ii) inter-community conflicts, often fuelled by clashes over scarce resources and ethnic resentments; and iii) complaints about electoral processes whereby political parties have ignited or aggravated civil strife through violence (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5. Violence by non-state actors in Africa, by type, 2013-15



Note: Each violent act has been weighted by its intensity (number of deaths and/or injuries) according to a scaling methodology detailed in the annex of this report.

Source: Authors' calculations based on news reports by journalists and press agencies across Africa and verified by AFP and Reuters.

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## Several African countries are innovating to meet the growing demand for public services

What are the challenges and opportunities in governments' ability to deliver public services for its citizens effectively? With growing populations and increasing democratic assertiveness, public service delivery is faced with capacity constraints. Where this happens, institutions have no choice but to innovate and change. Indicators of governance quality suggest that demands by African citizens on their institutions are leading not only to improved services but also to reforms to improve institutional capacity. Finally, there are examples of international initiatives reinforcing the effectiveness of service delivery.

### The performance of African governments in delivering public services varies greatly across the continent


In the 46 African countries surveyed in the Gallup World Polls in 2013 and 2014, wide variations can be observed in the net satisfaction rate of service delivery in health, education, transport and housing, reflecting highly heterogeneous citizens' appreciation of state performance. The wording of the questions was: "In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with...?". With regards to **public transportation systems**, while there was a net dissatisfaction rate of 15.2% on average, the results ranged from a net dissatisfaction rate of 62% in Central African Republic to a net satisfaction rate of 42% in Mauritius. In **health service delivery**, Africans are mostly dissatisfied with its provision by their governments, with a net dissatisfaction rate of 22% on average. However, a positive rating of governments' performance in health delivery was recorded in nine countries, ranging from 5% in Botswana to 59% in Rwanda. As for states' performance in delivering good and affordable **housing**, 17% of people were dissatisfied on average across the 46 countries, with again wide disparities, ranging from 65% net dissatisfaction in Libya to 32% net satisfaction in Rwanda. **Education** is the



service delivery showing the highest net satisfaction rating, with a net balance of 5.1% of African citizens satisfied on average. Twenty states showed a positive satisfaction rate, while 24 had a negative satisfaction rate (data were missing for two countries). A similar survey by Afrobarometer confirms the relatively more positive perception in governments' performance in delivering education, with an average 20% satisfaction rate in the 33 countries surveyed.

Government expenses in Africa are lower in absolute terms in relation to GDP than in other regions. The average expense-to-GDP ratio is 29.7% in Africa, compared to 40.9% in OECD countries on average. In 2014, African governments spent under USD 2 000 per capita, with Libya (LBY) and Seychelles (SYC) as the two exceptions (Figure 5.6). In comparison, Brazil (BRA) spent about USD 4 300 per capita, China (CHN) roughly USD 2 500 but India (IND) only USD 360.

Figure 5.6. Government expense per capita vs. government expense as % of GDP, 2014




Source: Authors' calculations based on IMF (2015a).  
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Even at low levels of tax collection, several countries in Africa display high levels of efficient public sector management by global standards. Figure 5.7 plots countries in Africa and the rest of the world according to their tax-to-GDP ratios and the quality of public sector management as measured by their ratings in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank. It helps identify some of the public sector management success stories. For example, despite tax-to-GDP ratios under 20%, Cabo Verde (CPV), Ethiopia (ETH), Rwanda (RWA) and Senegal (SEN) achieve above-middling CPIA scores. By contrast, other countries with higher tax-to-GDP ratios have low scores. The majority of African countries have both low tax-to-GDP ratios and low public sector management scores.

Similar disparities are observed in terms of the readiness of administrations to promote staff on the basis of merit and professional skills. Figure 5.8 compares spending efficiency with an estimate of the degree to which merit is prioritised in hiring (World Economic Forum [WEF] Executive Opinion Survey, 2014). Like in comparator groups, however, the more hiring is based on qualifications, the more efficiently public revenue is allocated. Rwanda scores among the best performing countries on both accounts.

Figure 5.7. Public sector management vs. tax-GDP ratio




Note: The public sector management and institutions cluster includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilisation, quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector.

Source: Authors' illustration based on World Bank (2016a) and IMF (2015a).

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Figure 5.8. Hiring based on merit and qualifications vs. efficiency in public revenue spending



Notes: Question 1.7 In your country, to what extent do government officials show favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts? (1=always show favouritism; 7=never show favouritism). Question 1.8 In your country, how efficiently does the government spend public revenue? (1=extremely inefficient in providing goods and services; 7=extremely efficient).

Source: Authors' illustration based on WEF (2014).

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According to Africans, corruption – the exercise of public power for private gain – remains a primary obstacle to the state providing public services and protecting public interest. In 2015, 58% of the African respondents of Transparency International's survey for its Global Corruption Barometer thought corruption had increased (Transparency International, 2015). In the 12 months preceding the survey 22% of public services users had paid a bribe across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), equivalent to nearly 75 million people. African anti-corruption bodies tend to lack resources, and very often a high proportion of citizens think their governments are still performing poorly in fighting corruption. On average 64.4 % of Africans declared their government is handling the fight against corruption badly or fairly badly, while 30.6% think government actions against corruption are handled well or fairly well (Afrobarometer, 2015). Formal oversight institutions frequently face limitations in performing their function of holding governments to account (IBP, 2015).

Accountability and the existence of checks and balances on public administrations and public policies are key for effectively providing public goods, delivering services and funding infrastructure. Accountability is a cornerstone of citizens' perception of good governance and crucial for the quality of public policies and the provision of public goods (World Bank, 2002). A lack of checks and balances enables corruption, which results in large financial costs and losses of quality in service delivery. For example, the office of the auditor general in Kenya, an independent public body promoting good governance and accountability in the management of public resources, revealed that less than 1.2 % of public spending was incurred lawfully and corresponded to accountancy rules (Kenya National Audit Office, 2015). This seriously undermines the capacity of states to respond to citizens' needs.

### **Policy initiatives are leading to more efficient, effective and inclusive services**

African countries can improve their service delivery despite the great diversity of policy contexts. Both academic literature and some recent policy reforms across the continent suggest that some general principles of policy improvement can apply to many countries. For instance, better priority setting, improved consistency of responsibility assignment across levels of government or agencies, better user information and better-balanced provider payment schemes are worth pursuing in many African countries (OECD, 2010a). If these general principles apply to many countries, however, individual policies do not. A one-size-fits-all approach to reform is not advisable.

Decentralisation can help improve service delivery when most of the regions are economically and fiscally sustainable. In several African countries, regions or municipalities rely primarily on government transfers (AEO, 2015). Administrative performance can be improved through local elections and civil society mobilisation when local government finances do not rely only on central transfers (Cabral, 2011). O'Neil and Cammack et al. (2014) find that in the case of local governments in Malawi, devolution is more likely to succeed in cities than in rural districts, as the former have better infrastructure, can generate more revenue and have more potential for performance monitoring, including by citizens.

Better management and optimisation of financial resources can significantly improve public service delivery. For example, the private not-for-profit (PNFP) contracting experiments in Uganda have shown positive results in terms of resource allocation and service delivery. Since 1997 and under the process of decentralisation and devolution

of power to local governance, the Ministry of Health has granted public subsidies to PNFP providers with the aim of expanding access to healthcare through public-private partnerships (PPPs), especially in underserved parts of the country. PNFP facilities now play a significant part in Uganda's healthcare system, as about one third of all health facilities in the country are operated by them (Lundberg, 2008).

The spread of information and communication technology (ICT) in Africa can also improve policy making and make a difference for people. Mobile phones are the most widely available type of infrastructure across Africa, with availability ranging from 70% to 100% in 2015 (Leo et al., 2015). Telemedicine (i.e. e-health) is one of many examples of ICT providing cost-effective solutions to some of the health challenges facing developing countries. Government policies can help establishing reliable and coherent privacy and security frameworks and accountability mechanisms that both encourage inclusiveness and respond to innovation.

- In **Ghana**, since 2012, the Novartis Foundation has been leading a PPP initiative providing teleconsultation services across 21 communities, in co-operation with sectoral ministries, the national health insurance agency and medical associations. The 24-hour teleconsultation centre pilot model helped reduce 31% of referrals, improved emergency transport facilitation, and the road map for scale up throughout the whole country is expected to be complete by December 2017 (Novartis Foundation, 2016).
- In **Kenya**, which already leads globally in mobile money payment facilities through its m-PESA service, an upsurge in telemedicine is enabling rural patients and health practitioners to interact through video conferencing with staff in Kenya's main hospitals. This has improved quality of care at little cost (Arrow and Sanghi, 2015).
- **Tanzania** has launched a programme to help parents register their children's births by mobile phone, as 80% of Tanzanians do not have birth certificates according to a 2012 census (Reuters, 2015a). This has a direct impact on access to public services in education and health and deprives the government of crucial demographic data to plan service provision for children and match decision-making with population needs (UNHCR, 2014).

In terms of reform efforts, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa are among the wealthier African countries having implemented successful healthcare systems (KPMG, 2012). In **Ghana** the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) initiated in 2003 has successfully reduced the proportion of out-of-pocket spending in total private healthcare spending, with salutary consequences for the poorest Ghanaians. In **Mauritius**, basic healthcare is provided even if the share of out-of-pocket expenditure is still high. In **South Africa**, NGOs and government are collaborating in sometimes innovative ways to improve healthcare outcomes for poorer areas.

Improved effectiveness is first and foremost achieved through sound policies. Despite very low levels of health spending (16 USD per capita in 2010) – the second lowest figure in Africa – **Ethiopia** has made progress in improving healthcare, mostly by reforming health administration services (KPMG, 2012). In Rwanda (Box 5.2), government has overcome very low per capita health expenditure (57 USD per capita in 2010, although the health budget as a proportion of the total budget is the highest in Africa) to deliver acceptable outcomes by combining different modes of financing, successfully lobbying for external funding and by making improvements to government health bureaucracy a priority (WHO, 2014).


### Box 5.2. Overview of the major improvements in Rwanda's health system

Under its Health Sector Strategic Plan 2009-2012 (HSSP II), Rwanda recorded outstanding socioeconomic progress following tremendous improvements and innovations in national healthcare policies. Since 2005, the country has developed a comprehensive financing framework for health systems based on best practices in global healthcare financing:


On the supply side, the central government increased transfers to local governments through fiscal decentralisation and offered peripheral health facilities on the basis of needs and performance. Policy actions included a health insurance system, with cross-subsidies from richer to poorer categories and medicine supply facilities (procurement and distribution). Currently, the Rwanda minister of health is conducting a series of reforms in its health management information systems, including automation.

On the demand side, Rwanda made exceptional progress in protecting households against catastrophic health expenditures by strengthening pre-payment mechanisms such as community-based health insurance and other health insurance schemes. There are also direct payments to the population through in-kind incentives. Those efforts have dramatically reduced the burden of out-of-pocket payments. General out-of-pocket expenditures dropped from USD 9.5 in 2006 to USD 4.09 in 2010 (WHO, 2014). Life expectancy at birth increased from 51 in 2002 to 64.5 in 2013 (NISR, 2013).

Figure 5.9. Out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare and total health spending in Rwanda, 1995-2013



Source: WHO (2014) and authors' calculations based on World Bank (2015).

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### A better allocation of international aid can help improve service delivery in low-income countries and fragile states

The effectiveness of international aid in helping improve public service delivery has been challenged in the last decade. An OECD analysis in 2015 found six SSA states are both fragile states and potentially under-aided: Chad, Madagascar, Malawi, Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo (OECD, 2013a). Such geographical gaps in aid distribution are a consequence of a lack of co-ordination. This is partly due to each donor having its own political priorities and incentives, leading to individual allocation decisions that vary greatly and do not depend on country needs or institutional performance. However, the Ebola virus outbreak of 2014/15 showed that fragile states are vulnerable to catastrophe and should not be neglected. Additional aid channelled as budget support can indeed help such countries when it is accompanied by targeted technical assistance that supports capacity-building and public financial management (Box 5.3).

### Box 5.3. Enhancing aid effectiveness in fragile states

The OECD defines fragile states as “having weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing populations, and lacking the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations within society” (OECD, 2011).

The dramatic consequences of the Ebola virus outbreak show that epidemics can become humanitarian disasters in countries with weak services. Significant problems were raised not only because of the insufficient resources for the health sector but also because of the fragmentation of the care delivery process and information failures. The under-resourced healthcare systems in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where 99% of the victims of Ebola were concentrated, struggled to contain the impact of virus.

Targeting aid to assist governments in the provision of basic services can greatly improve the health environment and increase resilience to epidemics. Even after they were declared free of Ebola in December 2015, the social and economic challenges in these countries remains critical. The World Bank estimates that the tragic outbreak cost USD 2.2 billion in foregone economic growth in 2015 in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2016b). Economic activity and investment have still not recovered. About 70 000 births were not registered during the epidemic, putting children at risk (UNICEF, 2015b). The World Bank warned in a report that mortality may increase in Liberia by 111% due to the deaths of healthcare workers in the country. Meanwhile, new health risks continue to arise and the healthcare system remains badly damaged. More than 500 people already died of meningitis in Niger in 2015, where schools have been shut down. The WHO warns of a high risk this disease becomes an epidemic in 2016 in the African meningitis belt from Mali to Ethiopia. This demonstrates that the structural deficiencies in health delivery still need to be addressed. Without improving the quality of healthcare infrastructure and services, these diseases will continue to inflict a vastly disproportional impact on these countries.

The contracting out of government functions and services to external providers is an established practice in many developed and developing countries. In fragile situations, the use of external providers has allowed developing and developed countries alike to provide essential services, such as clean water, and core functions, ranging from customs services to domestic resource mobilisation. When not done properly, contracting out risks bypassing or substituting the state and can undermine the development of its capacity to manage and deliver these services or functions.

Sources: OECD (2010b), OECD (2011), UNICEF (2015b), World Bank (2016b).

Aligning aid modalities with state-building processes can reinforce effective service delivery in the long term. For example, asymmetry in aid allocations has been on the development agenda since the adoption of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008. Strengthening strategic partnerships with national stakeholders is needed, in particular in the case of fragile countries. Some other international initiatives are also bearing fruit in health sector. The Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Partnership, launched in 1998 as a partnership between the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, has obtained encouraging results against malaria: in ten years the number of deaths dropped by 50% in 11 African countries (WHO, 2015). The second Global Malaria Action Plan for the period 2016-25 aims to maximise performance through a multi-sectoral framework engaging action for households beyond healthcare provision (RBM/UNDP, 2013). Another example is the polio eradication initiative, a PPP led by national governments and financed by a wide range of donors and foundations. About USD 11 billion invested since its launch in 1988 has reduced the incidence of polio by 99%, with only 75 cases worldwide in 2015, none of which is in Africa (International Monitoring Board Polio, 2015).

## Improvements in the business environment require time and must complement structural reforms to bear fruit

The quality of governance by public institutions affects economic growth through its impact on the business environment. The ability of the private sector to contribute to economic growth depends not only on economic factors such as supply, demand and inputs but also on the set of regulatory, legal and social constraints to its decision-making (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco [2005]; OECD [2007]; Xu [2010]; Monga and Lin [2015]). African countries, for their part, have been improving their business regulatory environments.

### African countries are making it easier to do business, and several appear among the world's top reformers

Many African countries have made efforts in recent years to improve their business environments. The World Bank keeps track of the number of reforms to administrative procedures undertaken each year by each country in its annual *Doing Business* report. The most common types of reforms have been in the categories for starting a business and getting credit. Between 2014 and 2015, 15 countries undertook reforms in the first category and 13 in the second. Since 2010, African countries have regularly been among the 10 best reformers (Table 5.2). Uganda, Kenya and Mauritania are the top three African reformers in the 2016 report.

Table 5.1. Top ten countries in the world since 2011 according to *Doing Business*, by year

Order	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
1	Kazakhstan	Morocco	Poland	Ukraine	Tajikistan	Costa Rica
2	<b>Rwanda</b>	Moldova	Sri Lanka	<b>Rwanda</b>	<b>Benin</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
3	Peru	Macedonia, FYR	Ukraine	Russian Federation	<b>Togo</b>	<b>Kenya</b>
4	Viet Nam	<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	Uzbekistan	Philippines	<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Cyprus
5	<b>Cabo Verde</b>	Latvia	<b>Burundi</b>	Kosovo	<b>Senegal</b>	<b>Mauritania</b>
6	Tajikistan	<b>Cabo Verde</b>	Costa Rica	<b>Djibouti</b>	Trinidad and Tobago	Uzbekistan
7	<b>Zambia</b>	<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Mongolia	<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>Congo, Dem. Rep.</b>	Kazakhstan
8	Hungary	<b>Burundi</b>	Greece	<b>Burundi</b>	Azerbaijan	Jamaica
9	Grenada	Solomon Islands	Serbia	Macedonia, FYR	Ireland	<b>Senegal</b>
10	Brunei Darussalam	Korea	Kazakhstan	Guatemala	United Arab Emirates	<b>Benin</b>
<b>Total African</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

Note by Turkey:


The information in this document with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue".


Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union:

The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Source: World Bank (2016c).


African countries are improving their *Doing Business* scores, although from a low basis when compared to the rest of the world. In 2015, six countries out of 54 in Africa were above the global median value for this score, while 26 out of 37 of the countries in the bottom quintile were African (Figure 5.10). However, some of the low-income countries such as Rwanda have scores close to the level of OECD countries. Mauritius ranked 32 in the world, ahead of 12 OECD countries. By contrast, despite high per capita incomes, several resource-rich countries – whose wealth is less dependent on the quality of their business environment – displayed lower scores.

Figure 5.10. *Doing Business* scores and GDP per capita, 2015


Source: Authors' calculations based on World Bank (2016c) and IMF (2015a).  
 StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933350492>

### Reforms may yield improvements over the long term, but short-term benefits are hard to come by

In general, the relationship between economic growth and improvement in the *Doing Business* scores is weak in the short-term. Haidar (2011) estimated that GDP growth increases 0.15 percentage points of GDP on average with every positive reform. However, in practice, benefits are masked by the effects of more powerful constraints, such as unreliable electricity supply, low confidence in political institutions, standards and trade relations and informal practices or opacity in delivering trade licences. Figure 5.11 shows how the change in *Doing Business* scores over 2010-14 has been weakly correlated with the change in GDP per capita over the same period.

Figure 5.11. Change in *Doing Business* score and GDP per capita between 2010 and 2014

Note: 2010-14 is the longest period in which there was a consistent time series for *Doing Business* scores (the methodology was changed in 2014).

Source: Authors' calculations based on World Bank (2016c) and IMF (2015).  
 StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933350502>




Indicators of competitiveness show Africa still lags behind other regions. The WEF's Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) measures what drives an economy's productivity and prosperity. It is a mix of economic indicators and the results of a survey of business leaders to measure how attractive a country is for investment. Although it does not cover every country in Africa, there is general convergence between it and the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index. Africa lags behind other regions of the world not just in the regulatory environment but also in general attractiveness to investment (Kessides, 2015). Rwanda, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa are the top-performing African countries in both the Doing Business Index and the GCI. On the other hand, Cameroon, Gambia and Senegal have good GCI scores but poor *Doing Business* scores. Tunisia had a high score in the Doing Business Index but a low one in the GCI.

### To create new economic opportunities obstacles such as infrastructure bottlenecks must be lifted

One difficulty in establishing a link between good governance and good economic performance is that changes in laws, regulations and policies will have less effect when substantial corruption or informal practices continue to prevail. Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2015) point out that the World Bank's *Doing Business* scores represent *de jure* regulations and do not correspond to what is reported by businesses in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. For example, the average number of days required to start a business in Egypt was reported as 138.9 in 2013 in the Enterprise Survey, while the number of days recorded while compiling the *Doing Business* data set was eight. On the other hand, the data used in the *Doing Business* scores included 86 days required to start a business in Zimbabwe in 2011, while according to the Enterprise Survey it was only six days on average. Very often, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs suffer more from informal administrative practices and red tape. In countries with high levels of corruption, businesses may even contribute to worsening this problem by using bribery to speed up administrative procedures. In other words, seemingly bold reforms do not necessarily have a meaningful economic effect.

Figure 5.12. Net perception rating for policies regarding reliable electric supply by country, 2014-15



Note: The Afrobarometer survey includes a range of questions on how the respondents perceive their government's performance on handling certain issues. Countries with negative scores have more respondents who think the government is doing badly on handling the specified topics. The range is from -100% (the worse) to +100% (the best).

Source: Leo et al. (2015), based on Afrobarometer 2014/15 (<http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online>).

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933350519>

Key economic infrastructure needs better maintenance policies and good management systems. In most African countries in 2014/15, a majority of citizens believed governments performed poorly on handling the provision of reliable electricity and road maintenance (Figure 5.12, Afrobarometer, 2015). Inadequate public infrastructure is a key obstacle to growth, particularly in SSA. For example, Patat (2015) points out that due to poor infrastructure, major hydro-electric projects face losses on their lines of up to 50%, often causing power outages in major African cities. Unreliable electricity production in turn seriously affects economic activities in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. In **Ghana**, long electricity cuts came on top of a sharp slowdown in the economy, sparking anger among voters (Reuters, 2015b). Severe electricity shortages in **South Africa** have become the greatest obstacle to economic activity and growth. This is a problem that may only be solved through structural reforms in infrastructure management (IMF, 2015b).

### Fighting terrorism requires better regional co-ordination and information sharing

African co-operation mechanisms have been set up against terrorism. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), led by the African Union and created in 2002, offers a multidimensional framework directed at handling the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. To make the APSA operational and to enhance security co-operation in the Sahelo-Saharan region, 11 neighbouring countries launched the Nouakchott process in 2013 (OECD, 2014). The Sahel G5, which includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger and was institutionalised in December 2014, is another initiative aiming to better co-ordinate its members' development and security policies. In addition, the Multi-National Joint Task Force was formed in May 2014 by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin to fight Boko Haram (Box 5.4).

International efforts have been made to help African countries deal with security issues. In the context of the EU-Africa partnership, the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) has deployed around 200 EU instructors in Koulikoro to provide training to official Malian armed forces, with a budget of EUR 27.7 million and a 24-month mandate from February 2013. The EUCAP Sahel mission offers another example of EU co-operation with Africa on security matters. It provides advice to the Nigerien and Malian authorities in setting up an integrated approach against terrorism and organised crime. France has been engaged militarily fighting jihadists in Northern Mali since 2012 in accordance with the United Nations Resolution 2100. Operation Barkhane replaced Operation Serval in August 2014, with a broader mandate to counter terrorism across the Sahel region. At the 2015 US-Africa summit, the US administration announced two initiatives to strengthen security and peace in Africa: The African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP, or A-Prep) and the Security Governance Initiative (SGI). A-Prep is a new investment of USD 110 million per year for five years to build the capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging conflicts.

Legal mechanisms to combat terrorism face implementation issues. There are already 19 international conventions dealing with terrorism (UNODC, 2016). In West Africa, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted several legal instruments to foster judicial co-operation between West African countries (OECD, 2013b) though implementation has been slow due to differences in legal systems, weak operational capacity and divergent priorities between countries (Yabi, 2010). New anti-terrorism laws passed in 2015 have been criticised as exposing civil organisations and political activists to abuses, raising concerns over possible infringements on the rule of law and civil and political rights (AFP, 2015a).

#### Box 5.4. Regional efforts against Boko Haram

The fight against transnational terrorism requires extensive cross-border co-ordination and co-operation. After the kidnapping of more than 200 schoolchildren in Chibok, Nigeria, a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in May 2014 by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin. It was set up outside ECOWAS regional conventions through the Lake Chad Basin Commission and formalised through the UN Security Council. Its 8 700-strong force has been deploying slowly, in part due to diplomatic difficulties between Anglophone Nigeria and its Francophone neighbours (AFP, 2015b). After taking office on 29 May 2015, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari re-launched the regional co-operation effort, holding many face-to-face meetings with his counterparts. However, although the MNJTF was meant to have been in effect since 30 July 2015, as of February 2016 it was still pending.

In addition to tackling terrorism and cross-border risks, policies addressing the root causes of conflicts and sources of vulnerability can improve the effectiveness of the peacebuilding processes within the countries. For instance, insecurity driven by inter-community conflicts and land disputes is a threat to political stability. Informal mining is one of the factors spurring illicit financial flows (Box 5.5).

#### Box 5.5. The need for better regulation of mining activities

Estimates of illicit flows of money in West Africa amount to over USD 15 billion, of which USD 3.5 billion originates from artisanal and small-scale gold mining (OECD, forthcoming).

Illegal mining activities are fuelling inter-community tensions in certain cases in West-Africa. Violent disputes can be the consequence of conflicts over resources as is evidenced by attacks over illegal mining activities in some countries. On 22 December 2015, violent clashes over land boundary issues and illegal gold mining activities occurred between the populations of Djélimala in Guinea and Karatou in Mali. The Malian and Guinean ministers organised a joint meeting with the local populations and advocated the banning of gold mining until the authorities had settled the land boundary issues (L'essor, 2016). In 2013, Angovia in Côte d'Ivoire experienced a violent clash between gold panners and the local population (RFI, 2013).

Disputes around land and access to natural resources pose a particular strategic risk, as the cost of inaction can be huge. If the presence of natural wealth can lead to civil unrest in relatively stable countries, it poses a particular hazard in regions that are already under the threat of armed groups. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been destabilised for more than 20 years by armed conflicts triggered by competition for the control of mining resources in the region. A UN report highlighted that the conflict in the eastern DRC is sustained by the prosperous trafficking of natural resources by organised criminal networks. Around 98% of the net profits from illegal natural resource exploitation goes to transnational organised criminal networks operating in and outside the DRC. It is estimated that 57% of mines in eastern DRC have an armed group presence. Illegal taxes are collected from 36% of the mines and provide the militias their income (UNEP et al., 2015). But armed groups retain only 2% of the net profits from illegal natural resource exploitation, the bulk goes to transnational organised criminal networks.

## Several African countries have seen their electoral processes become fairer

The process by which governments are selected and replaced plays a key role in economic development, as does the way in which the governments are monitored. Democratic consolidation in African countries has been associated with economic growth (Masaki and van de Walle, 2015). Principles such as transparency, accountability, non-discrimination or equality can increase development outcomes (OECD, 2012; Malhorta, 2015).

Strong political institutions are essential to not only sustaining governance gains, but also to responding adequately to citizens' needs. Elections are necessary but not sufficient to assessing the state of governance. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals, which were adopted in 2015, include commitments to building capable institutions. Some countries have seen moves toward stronger and more trusted institutions over the past year. The years 2016 and 2017 will be important steps to testing these positive signals for good governance in Africa.

## Fair and competitive elections help to enhance peace building and trust

The year 2015 demonstrated that when held in accordance with the law and principles of fairness elections can play a crucial role towards strengthening the legitimacy and credibility of institutions. In **Benin**, the intensity of political protests decreased sharply following the announcement of elections to be held in 2016 and a court ruling against a constitutional change that would have allowed the president to stand for a third term (IEP, 2015). In **Burkina Faso**, in the wake of national protests and a popular uprising leading to the fall of President Blaise Compaoré after 26 years in power, a democratic transition led to the election of Marc Christian Kaboré as the new president in December 2015. The transitional regime led by the diplomat Michel Kafando undertook economic and social reforms and a fight against corruption. The process was nevertheless characterised by tensions: the army attempted a coup in September 2015, which eventually failed, shifting power back to the transitional regime. **Guinea-Bissau** registered one of the largest improvements in the world in their Global Peace Index score due mainly to the holding of credible and predominantly peaceful elections in 2014 (Ibid). In **Zambia**, after the death of the sitting president Michael Sata in October 2014, the country held peaceful presidential elections in January 2015.

Despite these peaceful and democratic changes in 2015, election time is still often associated with surges in protests in several countries. As shown in Figure 5.3, protests over elections results or procedures were among the main protest motives reported from 2013-15. For example, the Ibrahim Index of Good Governance (IIAG) shows that **Ghana** remains one of the best performers in terms of democratic gains in Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015). Yet in 2015, supporters of the main opposition party held demonstrations asking to update the electoral list, which they claimed contained non-existent candidates and non-Ghanaians (AFP, 2015c; Reuters 2015c). In **Togo**, there was a general strike of schools and public hospitals, with thousands marching in the capital Lomé to protest the results of the presidential election of 25 April 2015. In the **Congo**, a referendum organised in October 2015 to change the constitution was met with some protests.

Elections are an essential component of democracy and open governance, but some countries are still struggling to make them transparent and fair. The African think tank the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IERPE) has scored half of the countries in Africa below 4.5 on a scale of 0 to 10 in its index for the freedom, fairness and competitiveness of elections from 2000-13. The index encompasses all the different stages of the electoral process, from the campaign and the election to the post-electoral period, as well as aspects such as procedures, freedom of assembly and legal restrictions

on political parties (IERPE, 2015). This indicates a need to further improve the electoral processes. Occurrences of vote-buying have been reported (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014), and political figures may seek political gains by instrumentalising societal divisions to fuel conflict (Bayart, 1989 and 2009). For example, since the overthrow of President Bozizé by the Seleka militia in 2013, the Central African Republic has gone through a severe political crisis which has exacerbated inter-community violence and destroyed economic progress. The crisis has completely paralysed the economy and prevented public administration and taxation, therefore depriving the country of resources.

### Civil societies are playing an increasing role in political governance

Civil society movements in Africa seem to shape ways for citizens to influence the quality of governance and political stability, as in Burkina Faso and Tunisia. These movements follow different patterns and different intensities in different countries (Box 5.6). There are now initiatives in seven countries that aim to hold officials accountable by other means than public protests or demonstrations (McNeil and Malena, 2010). They range from participatory budgets to independent budget analysis, participatory monitoring of public expenditures and citizen evaluation of public service. In Benin, the Social Watch Network, initially created to monitor the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), broadened its activities at the national level by developing strong partnerships and establishing good governance practices among stakeholders (McNeil and Malena, 2010).

More generally, accountability ecosystems within public administrations need to be strengthened to enable civil society to perform its oversight functions. Despite some successes, most African countries provide insufficient information for civil society and the public to understand or monitor budgets. Findings from the 2015 World Bank Open Budget Survey reveal that seven African countries are among the 12 characterised by a lack of budget transparency, weak legislatures, weak auditors and few or no opportunities for public participation (IBP, 2015). Only South Africa, the third best worldwide, scored very well across all dimensions. Malawi had a high ranking, at 18. Francophone West African countries, for their part, made remarkable progress from 2010 to 2015.

#### Box 5.6. The rise of civil society in Africa

Some civil society movements have played an important role in the political debate and in some cases were instrumental in regime change. In Burkina Faso, the association *Le Balai citoyen* acted as a major pacific democratic force in the popular uprising leading to the fall of the Compaoré regime in 2014. Made up of musicians, magistrates, journalists and students, it acted as a mediator between the military, the opposition and the population and campaigned to preserve the due process of the transition (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, 2015). In September 2015 when the RSP (*Regiment de sécurité présidentielle*) attempted a coup, this group maintained pressure on them to hand power back to the transitional civilian regime. This regime change was a case of democratic transition, where a civil society movement transcended ethnic divisions – often instrumentalised in conflicts in Africa – and united citizens around common aspirations for a social compact based on representativeness, protecting the public interest and democratic debate. Tunisia offers an example of successful actions led by civil society organisations: A quartet organisation received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 for its decisive contribution to the establishment of a pluralist democracy in Tunisia (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2015). In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia managed to consolidate real democratic gains, and this award is the symbol of the success of civil society organisations in conflict resolution. The coalition was made up of the General Union of Tunisian Work (*Union générale tunisienne du travail*, UGTT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Arts and Crafts (*Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat*, UTICA), the Tunisian League of Human Rights (*Ligue tunisienne des droits de l'homme*, LTDH) and the National Order of Tunisian Lawyers (*Ordre national des avocats de Tunisie*).

**Box 5.6. The rise of civil society in Africa (cont.)**

As such, it was able to establish a national dialogue, whose success is based on a true understanding of the local reality and the coalition's inclusiveness and diversity. By gathering different parts of the population for the common goal of social justice, this experience shows that civil society can play a crucial role in building and strengthening institutions in a given country.

Africa has seen others examples of civil society initiatives. In Morocco, the pro-reform movement M20 played a significant role in the modernisation of the constitution in 2011 (AEO, 2012). In 2011 and 2012, the Senegalese movement *Y en a marre* was active in pushing for better public services in the country. The *Tournons la Page* alliance, which has chapters in Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, the DRC, Belgium and France, is seeking to form a transcontinental movement promoting the principle of democratic change. However, the models are still fragile and the patterns are quite difficult to replicate.

Civil society organisations can thus play important roles in democratic transitions. The challenge is to maintain credibility and momentum.

**Elections will take place in nearly half of African countries in 2016 and 2017**

Looking forward, 26 African countries will hold national elections in 2016 and 2017. These represent opportunities to gauge how African institutions are maintaining governance gains and democratic consolidations (Table 5.2). Democratisation and stronger institutions are interrelated. When free and fair, elections can lead to democratisation and a stronger legitimacy for public institutions.

As countries progress and their societies are more demanding about the quality of governance, public institutions and civil societies need to play their part in improving the functioning of government. Government institutions and public services must be able to respond when citizens call for better economic opportunities. Key political tensions also need to be addressed through sound policies to sustain human well-being and development outcomes. In addition to their ability to serve the needs of populations, the effectiveness of African institutions in supporting development depends on their ability to foster peacebuilding and trust. This includes better processes, methods of governing and more efficient decision making, with effective control and compliance. Constitutionally mandated institutions improve the accountability, transparency and responsiveness of institutions (Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997), which in turn has an impact on the economic outlook.

Table 5.2. Overview of national elections in 2016 and 2017 in Africa

Country	Voting for	Date	
Benin	president	06/03 /2016 and 20/03/2016 (second round)	
Cabo Verde	president	31/08/2016	
Central African Republic	president and national assembly	14/02/2016	
Chad	president	10/04/2016	
Comoros	president	21/02/2016	
Congo, Rep.	president	20/03/2016	
Côte d'Ivoire	national assembly	Dec/2016	*
Democratic Republic of the Congo	president and national assembly	27/11/2016	*
Djibouti	president	08/04/2016	
Equatorial Guinea	president	30/11/2016	*
Gabon	national assembly, president	16/08/2016	*
Gambia	national assembly	01/12/2016	
Ghana	president and national assembly	07/11/2016	
Morocco	national assembly	07/10/2016	*
Niger	president and national assembly	21/02/2016	
Sao Tome and Principe	president	31/07/2016	
Seychelles	president and national assembly	31/10/2016	*
Uganda	president and national assembly	18/02/2016	
Zambia	president, national assembly	11/08/2016	*
Algeria	national assembly	2017	*
Angola	national assembly	2017	*
Kenya	president, national assembly and senate	31/08/2017	*
Lesotho	national assembly	2017	*
Liberia	president, national assembly	2017	*
Madagascar	president	2017	*
Rwanda	president	2017	*
Senegal	national assembly	2017	*
Sierra Leone	national assembly	2017	*

Note: \*Election dates to be confirmed.

Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (2016); International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2016).

### Note

1. For example, protests were restricted or banned from August 2014 until the official end of the Ebola epidemic in Guinea (29 December 2015), Liberia (November 2015) and Sierra Leone (7 November 2015).
  - **Chad** established a state of emergency on 09 November 2015, and **Mali** did so several times between 20 November 2015 and 31 March 2016.
  - **Egypt**, which is facing repetitive jihadist attacks against government forces, instituted a state of emergency from 24 October 2014 to 23 July 2015, renewing it for three months in August 2015.
  - **Niger** declared a state of emergency from 11 February 2015 to 26 January 2016, in particular in the Difa region.
  - **Tunisia** was hit by three waves of terrorists attacks in 2015. It instituted a state of emergency for the whole country for three months from the end of June 2015 to early October 2015, then for four months from 24 November 2015 to 21 March 2016.



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