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New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support

Biennial report on the review of the implementation of the commitments made towards Africa's development

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report, submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/293, reviews the implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development, highlighting progress, impact and challenges in four thematic areas critical to promote durable peace and sustainable development in the region as well as to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want of the African Union, namely (a) infrastructure development; (b) trade; (c) a conflict-free Africa; and (d) gender equality and women's empowerment.

On infrastructure development, African Governments and organizations have made progress, with the support of their development partners, in access to infrastructural services, including through cross-border projects. Continued joint efforts are needed to mobilize funding to meet the large infrastructure financing needs, estimated at over $100 billion per year.

On trade, the establishment of free trade areas proceeded, including with the Tripartite Free Trade Area signed in 2015, moving towards continental trade and market integration. Regional integration efforts yielded modest results in intra-African trade owing to high trade costs and supply-side constraints. Developing productive capacities of African least developed countries and structural transformation through industrialization remains a challenge.

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On achieving a conflict-free Africa, in spite of progress in operationalizing the African Peace and Security Architecture and improving governance through the African Peer Review Mechanism, challenges include lack of adequate funding for peace operations and institutional capacity to monitor, detect and curtail illicit financial flows from Africa.

On gender equality and women's empowerment, significant results were achieved in education, health and political participation owing to major legislative reforms. However, challenges remain in women's economic empowerment and human rights violations, with persistent gender disparities, violence against women and inadequate participation by women in peace processes.

Two major challenges emerge. The first of these is lack of adequate financial support for African countries to close the financial gap for infrastructural development, provide adequate trade finance to stimulate African exports, support peace operations and allocate resources for the principal gender equality and women's empowerment objectives, including in peace and security operations. The second is severe institutional and technical capacity constraints not only at country level, but also in the African Union and the regional economic communities, to undertake effective implementation in all four thematic areas.

I. Introduction

1. Following the adoption of the political declaration on Africa's development needs at the high-level meeting of the General Assembly, held in September 2008 (resolution 63/1), the Assembly adopted resolution 66/293 by which it established a United Nations monitoring mechanism to review commitments made towards Africa's development and requested the Secretary-General to submit a biennial report thereon. In the same resolution, the Assembly designated the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa as the secretariat for the biennial review in the context of its agenda item on the development of Africa, in coordination with relevant entities of the United Nations system, including the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Department of Public Information and other regional and international organizations and monitoring mechanisms. In operationalizing the mechanism, the Office of the Special Adviser drew on the reinforced role of the Interdepartmental Task Force on African Affairs to ensure coherence and coordination.

2. The present report is the second biennial report and has been prepared against the backdrop of the adoption in 2015 of major policy frameworks that will have a significant impact on Africa's development, peace and security, including Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want of the African Union and its first 10-year implementation plan (2014-2023); the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030; the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

3. As mandated by the General Assembly in resolution 66/293, the United Nations monitoring mechanism to review commitments made towards Africa's development is anchored in the principles of mutual accountability and partnership. It focuses on the implementation of multilateral commitments made by Africa's traditional and new and emerging development partners and by African countries, arising from, inter alia, major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields and summits with Africa's partners, including the Group of Seven (G-7), the Group of Twenty (G-20), the European Union and bilateral and multilateral partners. Timely fulfilment of commitments is critical for Africa to implement the 2030 Agenda and its ambitious continental framework for development, peace and security, as encapsulated in Agenda 2063 and its first 10-year implementation plan.

II. Process and scope of the report

A. Process

4. Extensive consultations with African stakeholders were held in connection with the preparation of the present report, as mandated by the General Assembly in resolution 66/293. ECA and the African Union Commission were consulted in Addis Ababa on 5 and 6 October 2015; members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) and the OECD were consulted in Paris on 23 and 24 November 2015; and new and emerging development partners in collaboration with the Economic

and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) were consulted in Bangkok on 8 and 9 December 2015.

5. Consultative meetings were complemented by a comprehensive questionnaire-based survey of key stakeholders, consisting of Member States, academia, civil society organizations as well as regional and subregional organizations, seeking the perspectives of recipients on the extent to which commitments were delivered, as well as challenges, outcomes, impacts and further measures needed to implement the commitments.

B. Scope

6. Following consultations, and with endorsement obtained through the Interdepartmental Task Force on African Affairs, four thematic areas were selected: (a) infrastructure development; (b) trade; (c) achieving a conflict-free Africa; and (d) gender equality and women's empowerment. The Task Force sought to align the report with the intergovernmental agendas at both regional and global levels, including Agenda 2063, the strategic frameworks of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) for the period 2014-2017, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

7. The four thematic areas to be reviewed in the present report are:

(a) *Infrastructure development*, which is aligned with Goal 4 (transformed economies and job creation) and Goal 10 (world class infrastructure criss-crosses Africa) of the first 10-year implementation plan, while pursuing Sustainable Development Goal 7 (ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all) and Goal 9 (build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation);

(b) *Trade*, which is consistent with the pursuit of Goal 4 and Goal 20 (Africa takes full responsibility for financing its development) of the first 10-year implementation plan, is a central component of Sustainable Development Goal 17 (strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development);

(c) *Achieving a conflict-free Africa*, which is consistent with Goal 13 (peace, security and stability are preserved), Goal 14 (a stable and peaceful Africa) and Goal 15 (a fully functional and operational African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)) of the first 10-year implementation plan, as well as with Sustainable Development Goal 16 (promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels);

(d) *Gender equality and women's empowerment*, which is addressed by Goal 17 (full gender equality in all spheres of life) of the first 10-year implementation plan as well as Sustainable Development Goal 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls).

8. These thematic areas were reviewed against the following background:

(a) *Infrastructure development* has received increasing attention owing to the emphasis in Agenda 2063 on its indispensable role in realizing the African Union vision of a prosperous, peaceful and integrated Africa. The spotlight on the

African Union Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) has begun to mobilize African Governments, organizations, and regional economic communities (RECs), along with development partners, to seek solutions to overcome implementation challenges. The United Nations-African Union partnership on Africa's integration and development agenda for 2017-2027 recognizes infrastructure development as a priority area. With the slowing of the world economy and weaker prospects for raw materials, the mainstay of African exports, maintaining high growth will become more challenging. An Africa-driven push for infrastructure development can help offset this negative trend;

(b) *Trade*, following important milestones in the period 2015-2016, has become particularly relevant owing to its impact on regional integration. First, the signing of the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement and the launching of formal negotiations on the Continental Free-Trade Area, to be achieved by the end of 2017, demonstrate collective action among African countries to realize the benefits of sustainable development and regional integration. Second, the agreement on a series of trade initiatives — including the commitment to abolish export subsidies for farm exports — secured at the tenth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Nairobi in December 2015, will especially benefit low-income countries;

(c) *Achieving a conflict-free Africa* is fundamental to the foundation of peace and prosperity in the continent, as reflected in the goal of "silencing the guns: prerequisites for realizing a conflict-free Africa by 2020". This goal was reaffirmed in Agenda 2063 and has inspired policies and actions by African Governments, including improving governance, promoting inclusive economic growth and establishing continental and subregional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as post-conflict management. International support for these efforts continues to be critical;

(d) *Gender equality and women's empowerment* is a high priority in both Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda, to which African countries contributed through the African Common Position, recognizing that the removal of impediments and disparities that affect African women is crucial for people-centred sustainable development. In launching the first 10-year implementation plan for Agenda 2063, the African Union Commission also designated 2015 as the Year of Women's Empowerment and Development towards Africa's Agenda 2063, and 2016 as the African Year of Human Rights, with a particular focus on the rights of women.

9. To provide continuity and coherence, themes covered in the current report are linked to those covered in the first biennial report (A/69/163). That report covered the strong nexus between trade and industrialization; infrastructure financing and aid for trade, which have important linkages with development financing; achieving a conflict-free Africa, building on governance; and women's economic empowerment, which requires, inter alia, an expansion of their inclusion in agriculture and agribusiness. In examining these four themes, the present report highlights cross-cutting issues, such as youth, governance and the role of the private sector.

III. Assessment and findings on the implementation of key commitments for the four themes

10. This section assesses progress in the implementation of commitments made by African countries and their development partners in the four thematic areas, highlights their impact and identifies challenges. On the basis of the review of the detailed list of commitments made by African countries, OECD-DAC member countries and new and emerging development partners and the review of surveys conducted with relevant stakeholders, 13 commitments were identified for systematic assessment.

11. The present report builds on other existing monitoring mechanisms, including *The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa: Promise and Performance 2015*, compiled by ECA and OECD in consultation with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, as well as other relevant monitoring mechanisms such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund global monitoring reports, the Africa Progress Panel Africa progress reports, the *Development Support Monitor* of the African Monitor, the International Aid Transparency Initiative, various accountability reports issued by the G-7 and the G-20 members on their development commitments towards Africa, and individual monitoring reports by the United Nations and the African Union as part of the implementation of frameworks for the selected themes. Outcomes of the aforementioned three consultative meetings with stakeholders were also reflected.

A. Infrastructure development

12. With many small economies in Africa, one fourth of which are landlocked, the African Union has launched PIDA as the strategic framework for regional infrastructure priorities and for establishing a common agenda for mobilizing resources for infrastructure development across Africa.

Commitment A.1: reform and harmonize national regulatory environments and promote the development of regional infrastructure projects

Implementation

13. Nationally, African Governments adopted reforms to promote private sector participation in infrastructure; facilitate cross-border energy trading; improve transport facilities with the creation of road funds and road agencies, railway concessions, port reforms and multi-country facilitation initiatives; and promote the creation of independent regulators.

14. Regionally, interventions aimed at harmonizing policy, legal and regulatory frameworks were undertaken by RECs. In the last two years, NEPAD led efforts to identify challenges to the implementation of PIDA projects, including lack of capacity for project preparation; weak inter-country coordination mechanisms; non-robust legal, policy and regulatory environments; private sector (dis)engagement; lack of finance; and complexities of pooled funding for multi-country projects.

Impact

15. In spite of regulatory reforms, progress in access to infrastructural services has been slow. African countries trail other developing countries in access to power (30 per cent compared with 70-90 per cent), density of paved roads (34 per cent compared with 50 per cent) and access to improved sanitation (30 per cent compared with 62 per cent). The exception was mobile telephony, with subscriptions rising from 18 to 69.3 per 100 inhabitants over the period 2006-2014. The number of Internet users grew from 3.3 per cent in 2006 to 19 per cent in 2014. In North Africa, 99 per cent of the population has access to electricity. Nearly 80 per cent of those lacking access across sub-Saharan Africa are in rural areas. While 145 million people have gained access to electricity since 2000, Africa is the only region in the world where the number of people living without electricity is rising.[1] Tariffs in Africa are high compared with other developing countries owing to higher costs, small-scale production, inefficient use of resources, lack of competition and deficient price regulations, and privatization has had limited impact on the quantity and price of services.

16. Regarding regional projects, power pools have been established in all subregions with cross-border power trading in Southern and Western Africa. The East African Community (EAC) supported national road agencies to procure consultancy services for roads linking Rwanda and Burundi to the Central Corridor. The common market protocol allows free movement of people, goods, services and capital across the Community's five members: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has further articulated the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan and is facilitating the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision for air transport liberalization. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has embarked on an initiative to align national development plans with its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan.

Commitment A.2: mobilize increased domestic and external public resources for infrastructure development and help mobilize private sector participation in infrastructure

Implementation

17. In most African countries, domestic public sector resources (tax revenues and user charges) contribute about half of total infrastructure spending. Regional development banks, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, also provide significant financial support. The Continental Business Network was launched in 2015 to strengthen private sector engagement in priority projects.

18. Partners contributed resources through official development assistance (ODA) from OECD-DAC members and official finance from new and emerging development partners. ODA for Africa's infrastructure increased from $3 billion in 2002 to $11.1 billion in 2013.[2] The European Union-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund supports regional projects. Among new and emerging development partners,

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[1] ECA and OECD, *The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa: Promise and Performance 2015*, pp. 16-17.

[2] Ibid., p. 41.

China's significant cumulative infrastructure investments of roughly $35 billion for 400 projects include several resource-financed infrastructure projects, where funding is securitized against future revenue streams from resource extraction.[3]

Impact

19. Regarding total resources for infrastructure development, financial commitments reported by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, launched at the Gleneagles Summit of the Group of Eight in 2005 to enhance infrastructure investment, reached $74.5 billion in 2014. Forty-two African Governments provided $43.6 billion (58.5 per cent of the total), including funding by utility companies and subnational governments. Traditional development partners provided $7.9 billion; new and emerging development partners $8.5 billion; multilateral development banks $11 billion; African regional development banks $1.6 billion; and the private sector $2.9 billion. The transport sector received 46 per cent of the commitments, followed by energy (30 per cent) and water (13 per cent).

20. African countries increasingly rely on private sector participation for infrastructure finance. Between 2000 and 2014, 608 projects with private sector participation in infrastructure were implemented in over 90 per cent of African countries, for a total investment of $90 billion.[4] Whereas the telecommunications sector used to account for the largest number of such projects, energy has accounted for 75 per cent of them in Africa in the last five years, with 130 independent power providers operating across sub-Saharan Africa. New private equity investors emerged with 27 funds providing $1.2 billion between 2010 and 2013.[5] Although private participation in infrastructure helps fill part of the funding gap and brings new management practices, over 60 per cent of such participation was by three large countries: Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.

21. New forms of finance are emerging across Africa. Sixteen African countries tapped the sovereign bond market with issuance increasing from $3 billion in 2009 to $13 billion in 2014.[6] Nine countries issued local currency bonds for infrastructure. Several subnational governments successfully issued bonds, and the largest South African pension fund invested in bonds to finance solar projects. Ethiopia and Rwanda experimented with "diaspora bonds" to mobilize savings. Nevertheless, Africa still faces significant challenges in fully mobilizing the financing needed to meet the infrastructure gap.

Commitment A.3: support bankable project preparation and implementation capacity in African countries

Implementation

22. Shortage of a pipeline of bankable projects constrains infrastructure development in Africa. The High-Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment, set up by the G-20, recommended a more proactive role for multilateral development banks in financing project preparation and thoroughly reviewing existing project

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[3] Håvard Halland and others, *Resource Financed Infrastructure: A Discussion on a New Form of Infrastructure Financing* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2014).

[4] World Bank Group, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, available from ppi.worldbank.org.

[5] Ibid.

[6] ECA and OECD, *The Mutual Review*, p. 16.

preparation facilities to restructure them sustainably. Subsequent assessment of those facilities by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa in 2012 identified 17 core facilities focused on project preparation, such as the important NEPAD Infrastructure Preparation Facility, now in its second phase. However, the Consortium's assessment revealed gaps in project preparation and it recommended more effective and coordinated project preparation facilities to promote public-private partnerships.

23. In response, African countries adopted the Dakar Agenda for Action in 2014 at the Financing Summit for Africa's Infrastructure to mobilize pan-African and global investments for infrastructure development on the continent. AfDB launched Africa50, a continental initiative for implementing projects from feasibility to financial closure to address both infrastructure and project preparation. Africa50 aims to reduce the project development cycle from the current 7-10 years to 3-4 years, thereby reducing the cost of project preparation from 10-12 per cent of the total cost to 5-7 per cent. To date, 20 countries and AfDB have subscribed to an initial aggregate of $830 million in shared capital.

Impact

24. Feasibility studies under PIDA are being undertaken in the energy (Kenya-United Republic of Tanzania-Zambia electricity interconnection) and transport (Central Corridor covering Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania) sectors. Lessons learned include the importance of ownership and buy-in by national authorities in regional projects.

25. The third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa in 2015, established a forum on infrastructure to build and enhance multilateral collaboration to better coordinate among infrastructure actors, including the private sector, to bridge funding and capacity gaps. The Global Infrastructure Forum was organized by key development partners and multilateral development banks on the margins of the Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, held in Washington, D.C. in April 2016.

Commitment A.4: promote renewable energy and energy efficiency in African countries

Implementation

26. Africa's response to climate change includes a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[7] Forty-two African Governments signed the Secretary-General's Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative, launched in September 2011. The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative was prepared at the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment to harness Africa's huge renewable (hydroelectric, wind, solar and geothermal) energy potential, which is substantially larger than the current and projected power consumption needs of the continent.[8]

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[7] Forty-seven African Member States have signed the Paris Agreement on climate change, and two have ratified it.

[8] International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), *Africa's Renewable Future: The Path to Sustainable Growth* (Abu Dhabi, 2013).

27. Among African institutions, AfDB established the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa in 2011 to scale up its engagement in renewable energy and energy efficiency. The Fund comprises the African Renewable Energy Fund, with $200 million of committed capital to support small- to medium-scale projects underwritten by investments from the European Investment Bank, and the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund. AfDB issued $500 million in green bonds and offered to host the SE4ALL Africa Hub. NEPAD, the African Union Commission, ECA and the Government of Nigeria developed Africa Power Vision as a continental vehicle to increase access to green energy.[9]

28. Development partners provided support, including through the Power Africa initiative, funded by the United States of America and launched in June 2013 to increase electricity access to 60 million new households and businesses. Power Africa launched the Beyond the Grid initiative to unlock investments and growth for off-grid and small-scale renewable energy solutions. Leaders at the G-7 summit in 2015 pledged to accelerate access to renewable energy in Africa. The Global Environment Facility launched a fund to finance low carbon energy assets in developing countries to leverage over $100 million.

Impact

29. South Africa secured 16 deals totalling $4 billion in 2014. Ten other countries negotiated private funding arrangements on solar and wind energy, and hydroelectric power. Kenya reached financial closure on Africa's largest wind farm, costing $779 million. Mainstream Renewable Power, a market developer, created a $1.9 billion pan-African renewable energy platform with a private equity firm. Access to modern and sustainable energy services is being expanded locally through community involvement for renewable energy, including biomass, geothermal, small-hydro, wind and solar energy.[10]

30. The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative is a transformative, Africa-led initiative to meet the climate-resilient energy challenge with additional renewable energy generation of at least 100-300 GW by 2030. The position of African leaders for the establishment of a global partnership to accelerate the energy transformation required to keep global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius was endorsed by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment in March 2015 and the African Union Assembly, which called on the Green Climate Fund and all partners to support its operationalization.

31. Several African countries have a favourable ranking on the Global Green Economy Index. In 2014, 5 of the 12 African countries covered — Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda and Zambia — were in the top half of the table.[11]

Overall assessment and key challenges

32. Progress in access to infrastructural services and closing the infrastructure gap has been slow. Regionally, NEPAD led efforts to identify and remedy challenges to

[9] See *Africa Power Vision Concept Note and Implementation Plan: From Vision to Action* (NEPAD, 2015), available from www.icafrica.org.

[10] Alliance for Rural Electrification, *Best Practices for Clean Energy Access in Africa* (Eschborn, Germany, 2015).

[11] Jeremy Tamanini and others, *The Global Green Economy Index (GGEI 2014): Measuring National Performance in the Green Economy* (Dual Citizen LLC, 2014).

cross-border PIDA projects in energy and transport. However, international support for the implementation of the Dakar Agenda for Action and for PIDA has been lukewarm, leading to the adoption, at the African Union summit held in June 2015, of a resolution in which leaders requested support for PIDA and the Partnership on Africa's Integration and Development Agenda and recommended that the General Assembly support PIDA concretely.

33. The key challenges are:

(a) *Accelerating the pace of reform*. Many African countries have not been effective in ensuring a transparent investment climate with clear regulations to facilitate private sector participation;

(b) *Closing the financing gap*. About $55 billion in new investments are required annually to achieve universal electricity access by 2030.[12] Total infrastructure investment requirements exceed $100 billion annually. The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, chaired by Thabo Mbeki, recommended in its report[13] radically reducing illicit outflows to safeguard resources towards, inter alia, infrastructure development;

(c) *Project preparation and implementation*. More capacity is required to develop and implement pipelines of bankable projects;

(d) *Renewable energy*. Redoubled efforts are needed to capitalize on Africa's huge renewable energy potential.

B. Trade

34. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 recognize trade as an important means and regional integration as a key pillar for achieving sustainable development. African leaders' commitment to regional integration, as encapsulated in the Abuja Treaty, envisaged the establishment of REC-level free trade areas and customs unions on the process of establishing the African Economic Community. To fast-track trade and market integration, African leaders decided to boost intra-African trade and establish a continental free trade area by consolidating REC-level free trade areas by the end of 2017. African leaders committed to improve the business environment, tackle supply-side constraints, and promote industrialization and export diversification regionally and subregionally to spur wider structural transformation. Africa's partners committed to reduce trade-distorting measures and improve access by African least developed countries to their markets.

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[12] Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmandia, *Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2010).

[13] *Track it! Stop it! Get it!: Illicit Financial Flows* (Addis Ababa, 2015).

Commitment B.1: promote regional integration through the removal of barriers to intra-African trade and freedom of movement and cooperation mechanisms on trade facilitation[14]

Implementation

35. The Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement signed in June 2015 brings together the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC and SADC, representing 26 countries and about 60 per cent of Africa's gross domestic product (GDP). Its three main pillars are market integration, infrastructure development and industrial development. Other initiatives include the launch of fast-tracked negotiations to finalize the continental free trade area before the end of 2017, the establishment of the ECOWAS customs union and the near-completion of the Arab Maghreb Union free-trade area negotiations. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has a free trade area with implementation challenges. NEPAD launched the Move Africa Initiative to reduce costs and increase efficiency in African logistics.

36. Tariffs on intraregional imports were reduced to less than 2 per cent in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, ECCAS and COMESA; 2.6 per cent in the Arab Maghreb Union; 3.8 per cent in SADC; 5.6 per cent in ECOWAS and 7.4 per cent in the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States,[15] while others worked on removing non-tariff barriers. Trade costs remain high, however, owing to weak infrastructure and non-tariff barriers. A comparative study[16] shows that trade costs in Africa were over 50 per cent higher than in East Asia, potentially affecting corporate investment decisions. Some African countries and development partners have begun to address bottlenecks under the multi-agency Trade Facilitation Support Programme.

37. Among development partners, the European Union launched the Pan-African Programme, with €845 million for the period 2014-2020 to foster Africa's integration. Trade Africa, a partnership between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa, was established to expand Africa's internal, regional and global trade. In 2011, the G-20 announced support for the regional integration agenda, Aid for Trade, and financing of regional infrastructure. The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement contains provisions for expediting the movement and clearance of goods and the commitment to abolish export subsidies for farm exports secured at the tenth Ministerial Conference of WTO, benefiting low-income countries.

Impact

38. Intra-African exports grew by 58 per cent, from $62 billion in 2010 to $98 billion in 2014. Compared with other developing regions, the share of intraregional exports, which averaged 15 per cent in Africa in the period 2012-2014, is significantly lower than for Asia (57 per cent) and Latin America (25 per cent). Intraregional exports are growing faster than Africa's exports to the rest of the world, with economic diversification taking hold and manufacturing constituting 40

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[14] "Trade facilitation" refers to the infrastructure, institutions, regulations, policies, procedures and services that facilitate international trade transactions.

[15] ECA, African Union and AfDB, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA VII): Innovation, Competitiveness and Regional Integration* (Addis Ababa, 2016).

[16] AfDB, "Trade and trade costs in Africa" in *African Development Report 2010: Ports, Logistics, and Trade in Africa* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010).

per cent of intra-African exports, compared with 21 per cent of its exports elsewhere.[17]

39. While tariffs are decreasing globally, the incidence of non-tariff measures is on the rise. While sanitary, phytosanitary and technical regulations may serve legitimate health and environmental objectives, they raise prices and tend to disproportionately reduce exports from least developed countries given their lack of capacity to comply with requirements. This can be alleviated through increasing transparency, reducing policy divergence and building the capacity to comply with such measures among low-income-country exporters.[18]

40. Gains due to improved trade facilitation could lead to a 7 per cent increase in the share of exports over GDP in Africa. Reduction in trade costs associated with non-tariff measures in SADC countries can generate welfare gains of about $12 billion to its members.[19] Concerns remain that precise commitments on the trade facilitation measures were not complemented by similarly binding commitments on technical and financial assistance.

Commitment B.2: develop policies and business environments to overcome supply-side constraints and for export diversification; support the processing of African agro-produce and industrial raw materials

Implementation

41. According to the World Bank, over 60 per cent of African economies implemented at least one business environment-related reform in the past five years, making it easier to do business, as compared with 33 per cent recorded in 2005. Africa accounts for more than half of the top 20 most improved countries in terms of business regulations worldwide since 2009. African Governments also tackled supply-side and competitiveness problems through national actions and regional initiatives to develop productive capacity through, among others, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme, which provides the foundations to launch the African Agribusiness and Agro-industries Development Initiative and the Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa. At the regional level, EAC, SADC and COMESA developed industrial policies to foster economic transformation through industrialization.

42. For its development partners, China committed to implement the "Special Plan on Trade with Africa", consisting of, inter alia, technical support for processing African agro-produce and industrial raw materials. China's investments in special economic zones in Africa provide, inter alia, Chinese experience and technology for industrial development. Aid for Trade commitments to Africa from OECD-DAC members rose from an annual average of $7.9 billion over the period 2002-2005 to $19.3 billion in 2013, with economic infrastructure (53.9 per cent) and building productive capacity, including private sector development (43.3 per cent) making up the largest categories. Between 2006 and 2013, Aid for Trade disbursements to

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[17] WTO, *International Trade Statistics 2015* (Geneva, 2015).

[18] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Non-Tariff Measures to Trade: Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries* (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/1); *Non-Tariff Measures and Regional Integration in the Southern African Development Community* (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2014/5); *Trading into Sustainable Development: Trade, Market Access, and the Sustainable Development Goals* (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2015/3).

[19] UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2014/5, p. 22.

Africa reached $97.2 billion (39.4 per cent of the world total), three quarters of which were allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and $10.7 billion to regional programmes.[20]

Impact

43. The value of Africa's merchandise exports rose from $148 billion in 2000 to $630 billion in 2012. With the sharp decline in commodity and oil prices, export values fell by 12 per cent in the period 2013-2014. Consequently, while the value of world exports increased by 24.5 per cent over the period 2010-2014, Africa's exports rose by only 9.3 per cent over the same period, causing a decline in the global share to 3 per cent in 2014. To overcome dependence on commodity exports, African economies have begun to diversify. The share of fuel and mining products in total exports from Africa declined from a high of 70 per cent in 2012 to 63 per cent in 2014. The steady increase in the value of manufactured goods exports, particularly chemicals and automotive parts, which almost doubled between 2010 and 2014 to reach $20 billion,[21] provides encouraging signs that some export diversification is taking place.

44. Africa's services exports increased from $61 billion in 2005 to $103 billion in the period 2014-2015. However, the share of African services exports in world services trade has not increased. During the same period, Africa's services trade deficit increased on average by 9.4 per cent per year. Services value added in Africa rose from 53 per cent in 2006 to 58 per cent in 2014.[22]

45. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly moving to non-resource sectors. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), although concentrated in a few countries, services FDI accounted for almost half of Africa's total stock of FDI, ahead of the manufacturing (21 per cent) and primary sectors (31 per cent). Half of the top 10 investors in Africa were from emerging economies, including China, South Africa and India. China's FDI stock increased more than threefold from 2009 to 2014, as China overtook South Africa as the largest investor from an emerging country in the region.

46. Intra-African investments are trending up, driven by a continuous rise in South African FDI into the continent and by increases of flows from Kenya, Nigeria and Northern African countries since 2008. Between 2009 and 2014, the share of cross-border greenfield investment projects originating from Africa rose to 19 per cent of the total, from less than 10 per cent in the period 2003-2008.

47. Europe continues to be the largest importer of African products, accounting for 36 per cent of total exports, followed by Asia (27 per cent). China is Africa's largest trading partner, with total bilateral trade flows of $222 billion in 2014, followed by Europe and the United States. With the slowdown of China's growth rate, demand for commodities and low commodity prices, trade between China and Africa declined in 2015.

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[20] OECD and WTO, *Aid for Trade at a Glance 2015: Reducing Trade Costs for Inclusive, Sustainable Growth* (Paris, 2015).

[21] WTO, *International Trade Statistics 2015*.

[22] World Bank, World Development Indicators database and World Bank and UNCTAD statistics.

Commitment B.3: reduce, with the aim of eliminating, trade-distorting measures, including domestic support and export subsidies, in sectors where these are harmful to African countries' exports; enhance support to African least developed countries through duty-free and quota-free trade preferences

Implementation

48. G-7 and G-20 have repeatedly committed to reduce trade-distorting measures. The 2008 global financial crisis led to a sharp spike in protectionism in early 2009. The slowdown in global growth beginning in 2012 led to further trade protectionism as countries tried to shift the burden of adjustment from domestic to foreign firm investments. Protectionist measures have included anti-dumping and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade and measures affecting various service sectors.[23]

49. WTO members, especially developing countries, consistently demanded the removal of export subsidies used by developed countries to support agricultural exports. The tenth Ministerial Conference of WTO, held in December 2015, called for all developed countries to eliminate export subsidies by 2018, including farm subsidies, while allowing developing countries, under certain conditions, to provide export subsidies to partially offset the transport, freight and marketing costs of agricultural products.

50. On market access, WTO members agreed at the sixth Ministerial Conference, held in Hong Kong in 2005, that developed-country members and developing-country members that could afford to do so could provide permanent duty-free and quota-free market access for all products originating from least developed countries by 2008. This was reiterated in the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020. Most developed countries implemented duty-free and quota-free market access schemes, at various levels. Under the Everything but Arms initiative, the European Union provides such access to least developed countries while non-least developed countries receive similar treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences. Canada and Japan provide duty-free coverage to 98 per cent of tariff lines while duty-free schemes allowed by the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act cover 82.4 per cent of imports from least developed countries. China has extended the zero-tariff treatment to 97 per cent for 31 African countries while India's duty-free access programme was recently extended to 85 per cent of its tariff lines for least developed countries.

Impact

51. Existing preference schemes, including duty-free and quota-free access, have had mixed effects on the exports of African least developed countries. While most low-income African countries have benefited from preferential access to European markets through the Cotonou Agreement and, to a lesser extent, to the United States market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act, accessing export markets remains a challenge. Within manufacturing, only apparel has benefited from such schemes, specifically from the United States Act. One major challenge facing exporters from least developed countries is the need to meet the rules-of-origin requirements for duty-free access.

[23] The reports on G-20 trade and investment measures by OECD, WTO and UNCTAD show that G-20 member States have enacted or adopted over 1,441 trade-restrictive measures since 2009; only 354 of these measures had been lifted by mid-October 2015.

52. Tariff rates have fallen globally in the last decades and market access conditions for African countries, including least developed countries, are increasingly determined by non-tariff measures such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade. The trade-distorting impact of non-tariff measures facing the key exports of least developed countries, such as textiles and clothing, footwear and agrifood products, amounts to about 10-27 per cent of the tariff equivalent.[24] The trade-distorting impact of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in the European Union, for example, is estimated to reduce low-income countries' agricultural exports by $3 billion more than the export loss experienced by countries that are competing with Africa in the European Union market.

53. There is big potential for African exports of the full implementation of duty-free and quota-free schemes, particularly by India and the United States.[25] In contrast, extending the Chinese scheme would have a modest impact as the bulk of Chinese imports from least developed countries consists of mineral fuels with little or no duty imposed.

Overall assessment and key challenges

54. Key remaining challenges are:

(a) On regional integration, while African RECs and countries have shown political will and promoted the establishment of free trade areas, continued commitments and efforts are required for all REC-level free trade agreements to be operational with a view to establishing a continental free trade area by 2017. The challenges moving forward are to adopt a comprehensive approach, including improving infrastructure, human resources and a trade- and investment-enabling environment; enhance coordination within Government and with the private sector; ensure adequate trade financing and other trade facilities; and ensure adequate cross-regional investment facilitation and promotion;

(b) On export diversification, developing production capacities remains a major challenge. Industrialization is crucial for structural transformation. However, a better understanding of the challenges of achieving positive results from investments in special economic zones is needed;

(c) On market access, key gaps remain in spite of significant progress, including in duty-free and quota-free access for African least developed countries to large emerging markets. Preferential programmes for least developed countries should make the rules of origin simpler and more flexible. Furthermore, increased technical assistance is imperative to reduce trade costs arising from non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade in African countries.

[24] UNCTAD, "Improving market access for the least developed countries in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", Policy Brief No. 06, October 2015.

[25] See V. Ancharaz, P. Ghisu and J. Wan, "Can India's duty-free scheme foster trade and development in African least developed countries?", *GREAT Insights*, vol. 3, No. 4 (April 2014); and K.A. Elliott, "Restoring US leadership on trade and development", Center for Global Development, CGD Brief, March 2013.

C. Achieving a conflict-free Africa

55. In the Solemn Declaration adopted on the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization of African States/African Union in 2013, participants at the African Union summit reiterated the goal of "silencing the guns by 2020". This goal was reaffirmed in Agenda 2063 and its first 10-year implementation plan, which prioritizes full-operationalization of APSA.

56. Intensified efforts by African countries, supported by their development partners, in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding reflect the recognition that conflicts are major impediments to sustainable development in Africa. Reducing conflicts requires addressing their root causes, including through, inter alia, sustained and inclusive economic growth, poverty eradication, national reconciliation and social cohesion.

Commitment C.1: intensify peace and security cooperation under the African Peace and Security Architecture and institutionalize innovative conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms at continental and regional levels as well as support for these efforts through training and funding

Implementation

57. Since its creation in 2002, the African Union has strengthened its conflict prevention, resolution and management capacity through institutional innovations. RECs have also established mechanisms for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace consolidation. The African Union has established and operationalized the five components of APSA. The Peace and Security Council is the main pillar, supported by the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System and the Peace Fund. The protocol establishing the Council recognizes the RECs as integral to APSA.

58. The Peace and Security Council authorized peace operations in Burundi (2003), the Central African Republic (2013), the Comoros (2008) and Mali (2013). African Union peacekeepers are operating in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Panel of the Wise has undertaken several political consultative and preventive missions, including in the Central African Republic (2007), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2011), Egypt (2011 and 2012), Kenya (2013), Mali (2012), Senegal (2012), South Africa (2009) and Tunisia (2011 and 2012).

59. The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis, an interim arrangement in preparation for the operationalization of the African Standby Force, was inaugurated in November 2013 but has not been deployed, though four of the five regional standby forces have become operational. The Continental Early Warning System was created to support decision-making and action by the Peace and Security Council to collect and analyse information on potential instability and to propose options. While the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework will guide the African Union Commission in diagnosing structural sources of conflict, country structural vulnerability analysis will help countries undertake self-assessments to identify their vulnerability to conflict, focusing on structural causes and potential drivers of conflict.

60. Subregionally, the African Union has worked with RECs to address conflicts and threats to peace and stability in the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, the Sudan and South Sudan.

61. The contribution by African countries to the African Union Peace Fund grew from $2.8 million in 2006 to $5.7 million in 2014, 7 per cent of the African Union regular budget; the target is 12 per cent, as agreed at the special summit of the African Union, held in Tripoli in 2009.[26] The African Union Commission, through the recently appointed African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund, is working on a clear road map to achieve the 25 per cent target for contributions by countries to the African Union's peace operations budget.[27]

62. Several development partners extended support for Africa's efforts in the peace and security area, both bilaterally and through their contributions to United Nations efforts. The European Union, through the African Peace Facility, committed €901 million to support the 2014-2016 action programme for the Facility. Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and the European Union contributed $34 million towards the $40 million African Union peace and security budget in 2014, which included financial support for the operationalization of APSA; Germany provided €100 million ($111.5 million) for institutional capacity-building. At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit, held in Johannesburg in 2015, China pledged $60 million to support the African Standby Force. In 2015, Turkey began disbursing its yearly $500,000 contribution to APSA.

63. The United States provided training and military equipment to combat terrorism in several African countries. Japan supported 12 peacekeeping operations training centres during the period 2013-2016 and trained African officials in counter-terrorism. Several new and emerging development partners provided assistance to African countries in peace and security by training military or police officers.

Impact

64. The African Union peacekeeping operations launched in Mali and the Central African Republic as well as in Somalia and in the Sudan (Darfur) contributed to stabilization in those countries. The Panel of the Wise, working with the Peace and Security Council and drawing on the Continental Early Warning System, helped mediate political crises through pre-election preventive diplomacy. RECs have increasingly taken a lead role in their subregions to mediate and help reduce political tensions. Africa's partners contributed critically to peace operations by funding over 80 per cent of the African Union's security budget.

[26] *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2014 Assessment Study*, p. 14.

[27] Press statement PSC/PR/BR.(DLXXXII), 14 March 2016 and Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXXIV), 15 June 2015.

Commitment C.2: supporting the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, including through the African Peer Review Mechanism, in peacebuilding efforts and peacekeeping operations

Implementation

65. African countries are fostering good governance and the rule of law by subscribing to the African Peer Review Mechanism, various declarations on good governance and democracy, and by conducting periodic elections. Since its inception in 2003, 35 countries have voluntarily acceded to the Mechanism, of which 17 have been peer reviewed. The growing role of civil society and non-governmental organizations in the governance process enables youth and women to become involved in holding public institutions accountable.

66. Having adopted a framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development in 2006 and launching the African Solidarity Initiative for the mobilization of resources for that purpose in 2012, the African Union is strengthening its peacebuilding efforts. The Initiative aims to support post-conflict reconstruction and development activities in Africa by mobilizing both financial and in-kind contributions from stakeholders from within the continent and beyond.

67. The United Nations provides extensive support for Africa's peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts. All six countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission are in Africa. The Commission assists these countries in their transition from conflict to peace through political and economic activities, including coherence-building among international stakeholders and advocacy for increased financial support for national peacebuilding efforts. A 10-year review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture conducted in 2015 culminated in the adoption of resolution 2282 (2016) by the Security Council and resolution 79/262 by the General Assembly, which underlined the need for enhanced support for sustaining peace in countries emerging from conflict. The Peacebuilding Fund had provided financial assistance to 20 African countries by the end of 2015. However, the Fund is experiencing a significant drop in funding, potentially constraining its ability to provide adequate assistance to African countries.

68. The African Union and the United Nations have a strong partnership in peacekeeping operations. Currently, nine United Nations peacekeeping operations are in Africa. The Organization took over the African Union-led peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic. The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations suggested that the United Nations should deepen its strategic partnership with the African Union and on a case-by-case basis provide enabling support, including through more predictable financing, to African Union peace support operations when authorized by the Security Council, even as the African Union builds its own capacity and resources for that purpose (A/70/95-S/2015/446). The United Nations and the African Union are undertaking an assessment of the mechanisms to support African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council through a joint framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security.

69. The United Nations allocated approximately 33.6 per cent of its funding ($376 million out of $1.2 billion) to African countries for special political missions in the period 2014-2015, 76.4 per cent of its funding ($6.3 billion out of $8.3 billion) for peacekeeping operations in 2015-2016 and 82.2 per cent ($512 million out of

$623 million) of its Peacebuilding Fund in the period 2007-2015.[28] The Organization also provides financial assistance to African Union-led missions through trust funds (e.g., the African Union-led missions in Mali and the Central African Republic) or the assessed budget (e.g., logistical support for AMISOM). The European Union, through its African Peace Facility, pays about 80 per cent of AMISOM troop, police and civilian allowances and salaries. Nonetheless, the continuing difficulties in funding AMISOM is illustrative of growing donor fatigue for African Union-led peace operations at a time when the Union has committed to contribute 25 per cent of the cost of those operations.

Impact

70. The African Peer Review Mechanism is helping develop a culture of transparency and accountability in Africa, thus boosting confidence in governance in the region. Its periodic reviews highlight critical issues worthy of special attention.

71. The Peace and Security Council has provided enhanced international support for peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected African countries. Financial assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund has played a critical role in peacebuilding. For example, the Fund financed projects in Sierra Leone to ensure democratic governance of the security sector; regional justice and security hubs were funded in Liberia; and a project to strengthen community-level early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms was funded in Guinea.

72. Peacekeeping missions in Africa contributed to the stabilization of conflict-affected countries and to building the capacity of the State to protect lives, revive basic social services, and support economic recovery and humanitarian assistance to displaced persons.

Commitment C.3: address drivers of conflict, including trafficking in small arms and light weapons and illicit financial flows from Africa

Implementation

73. Efforts to reduce trafficking in small arms and illicit trade in natural resources reflect the recognition that financial resources from the illicit trade in natural resources are used to purchase the small arms and light weapons that are fuelling conflicts and violence in Africa. In response to the experiences of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, national and international measures have been adopted to enact, strengthen and enforce national legislation and regulations to prevent illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Over 30 African countries have established national coordination agencies, 24 keep records on small arms transfers and 31 have small arms records in military or civilian holdings.[29]

[28] See A/70/348, table 8; United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Fact Sheet: 30 April 2016; and annual allocations from the Peacebuilding Fund, available from http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000.

[29] Sarah Parker and Katherine Green, *A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of National Reports* (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2012) and national reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action submitted by African countries every two years for the period 2002-2014 to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

74. United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions provide technical assistance to African countries to destroy small arms and light weapons and support for security sector reforms and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. The European Union extended financial support to the African Union project to fight against illicit firearms in order to strengthen institutional and civil society actors, including African regional police chiefs, through capacity-building and information exchange. France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the European Union provided financial and technical support to develop the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme.

75. Illicit financial flows can be both a cause and a consequence of conflict. They can lead to conflict by depriving Governments of revenue for basic social services, undermining confidence in the State and weakening institutions that can settle disputes peacefully. Conflicts create a permissive environment for illicit financial flows through increased corrupt and criminal practices.

76. In its report the High-level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa estimated that African countries lost over $50 billion a year through illicit financial flows, primarily through commercial transactions, tax evasion and bribery by multinational corporations, criminal activities (trafficking in drugs, people and arms) and corruption. Underreporting of the quantity and quality of natural resources allows rebel groups access to illicit funding to prolong conflicts. Meanwhile, double taxation agreements, if not well managed, can be manipulated to achieve illicit financial flows.

Impact

77. United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions provide assistance for destroying small arms and light weapons, security sector reforms, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in various countries, including by developing security sector reform strategies in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia and South Sudan. Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia also received support for security sector legislation to enhance parliamentary oversight of security sector institutions, or support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to rehabilitate State institutions. The High-level Panel offered a framework and generated momentum for action in curbing illicit financial flows from Africa.

Overall assessment and key challenges

78. Despite significant progress, owing to efforts by the African Union and RECs, with international support, the following challenges remain:

(a) Increased acts of terrorism, representing a rising new threat to peace and stability in Africa, including the Great Lakes Region, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and North Africa;

(b) Inadequate financial contributions by African Governments to the African Union Peace Fund and consequent inadequate staffing in key institutions of APSA;

(c) Absence of joint mechanisms between African countries and their development partners to monitor double-taxation agreements and tax evasion;

(d) Inadequate institutional and technical capacity to monitor cross-border flows of small arms and light weapons and illicit exploitation and trading of natural resources in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries;

(e) Political exclusion and weak political governance, including corruption and failure to promote broad participation of the population in the political processes, protect human rights, especially of women and youth, sustain national cohesion and deliver basic public services;

(f) Weak support for the implementation of the recommendations in the report of the High-level Panel;

(g) Lack of adequate funding for prevention and peacebuilding efforts, including the Peacebuilding Fund.

D. Gender equality and women's empowerment

79. The three categories of commitment in this section are assessed against the backdrop of the African Women's Decade (2010-2020) and the challenges of achieving Goal 17 of the first 10-year implementation plan of Agenda 2063 as well as Sustainable Development Goal 5. There are many multilateral commitments on gender equality and women's empowerment, starting from the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. More recently, the work of the Commission on the Status of Women and the Security Council, in particular resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2242 (2015), are pivotal.

80. African countries have entered into specific commitments, adopting, inter alia, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981 followed by several declarations and policies on gender equality in Africa. The African Union adopted a gender policy in 2009 and in 2014, the Addis Ababa Declaration on Accelerating the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action. The African Union designated both 2015 and 2016 as years for women in Africa.

Commitment D.1: provide policy and financial support to the achievement of gender equality and women's empowerment

Implementation

81. As acknowledged in the African Union Fiftieth Anniversary Solemn Declaration, the contribution of African women is indispensable (aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063), and African Governments have committed to achieve full gender equality in all spheres, addressing women's and girls' empowerment and ending violence and discrimination against them.

82. In accordance with this commitment,[30] African Governments continue to implement legislative reforms on women's human rights,[31] gender-targeted initiatives and policies, gender mainstreaming to achieve gender equality, promotion

[30] As recalled in the "Declaration on 2015 Year of Women's Empowerment and Development Towards Africa's Agenda 2063" (Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XXV)), the African Union gender architecture includes all past decisions and declarations on gender equality and women's empowerment and related global policies, including the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

[31] Gender equality is sometimes enshrined in national constitutions, as in Egypt.

of women's political participation and gender institutional mechanisms such as specific ministries or departments, networks, gender desks, interministerial committees and special funds.[32]

83. African countries make efforts to focus budgetary support on women's access to social services, particularly in education and health. Nine countries have adopted gender-responsive budgeting to identify gender-differentiated impact in government programming and budgeting.[33]

84. Gender-marked ODA from DAC members to Africa, growing at an annual rate of 6 per cent, increased by 28.7 per cent from 2010 to 2014 to reach $14 billion in 2014,[34] focusing on education, health and participation in public institutions. Further attention is needed in the areas of physical and psychological integrity of girls and women, and women's participation in peacebuilding processes.[35] However, almost 78 per cent of gender-marked ODA from DAC members relates to activities that contribute only indirectly to gender equality,[36] and no information is available from non-DAC members.

85. Consultations with new and emerging development partners revealed that support for gender equality is one of their principal objectives and their cooperation includes significant initiatives that support women and gender equality.[37]

Impact

86. With the focus of national policies and ODA on gender gaps in social services, significant results were achieved in education and health. In 25 out of 39 countries for which data are available, net enrolment ratios in primary education reached 80 per cent or above in 2012, with almost universal parity in Northern Africa, on track to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 5. In sub-Saharan Africa, girls' enrolment in primary school increased by 18 per cent between 2000 and 2012.

[32] ECA, African Centre for Gender and Social Development, *Recent Trends in National Mechanisms for Gender Equality in Africa* (n.d.).

[33] Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. ECA, "Twenty-year review of the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Africa regional review summary report 1995-2014", para. 19.

[34] According to the OECD/DAC gender equality policy marker, activities marked as "principal" are gender-targeted initiatives that pursue gender equality as their principal objective, while activities marked as "significant" are those that have another socially relevant objective (not a gender-related purpose), however beneficial to women and other social groups.

[35] These are the thematic areas of the European Union's new Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, which aims to ensure that 85 per cent of its programmes will contain gender-specific or gender-sensitive action by the year 2020.

[36] The component of ODA aiming at gender equality as the principal objective (22 per cent of gender-marked ODA) grew by 21.1 per cent annually between 2010 and 2014, reflecting increased gender targeting.

[37] Examples of such bilateral cooperation are the Women Forum in the context of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the mechanism that Africa and India agreed to create to enable women's groups to access credit, the emphasis placed by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency on initiatives related to women's empowerment at the meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum on Somalia held in Istanbul in February 2016, and the support of Brazil for several gender-responsive interventions in Africa, such as the Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer programme.

Progress was lower at the secondary level, where 12 countries reached parity,[38] and in tertiary education, where 8 countries reached parity in 2010.[39] Maternal mortality declined by 47 per cent between 1990 and 2013, from 870 to 460 deaths per 100,000 live births. The Millennium Development Goals target of a 75 per cent reduction of the maternal mortality rate between 1990 and 2015 was missed, owing to a high number of adolescent pregnancies and fewer skilled birth attendants.

87. Although gender-responsive budgeting has been piloted in a few sectors and countries, its broader application requires gender-disaggregated data, dialogue with civil society organizations and better interaction between line ministries and budgetary and planning authorities and between central and local governments, as in most countries budget lines are not gender-sensitive.

88. Women’s participation in politics has improved, except at the village level. Female presidents have been elected in three countries,[40] and most countries have increased women’s participation in national parliaments with nine countries reaching more than 30 per cent representation and Rwanda reaching an unprecedented 64 per cent. In sub-Saharan Africa, women’s representation in parliaments rose from 13 to 21 per cent from 2000 to 2013.[41] Northern Africa, which started from a lower base (3 per cent representation), recorded even faster growth, to between 18 and 20 per cent, in the same period.

Commitment D.2: support the promotion of women’s economic empowerment in all economic activities

Implementation

89. Women’s economic role has benefited from Africa’s sustained growth, improved education and health, and improved legal protection of economic and labour rights. Implementation of formal laws, however, often faces cultural resistance, especially in rural environments.

90. Gender-targeted national programmes and special funds, often supported by development partners, were established to support women’s income-generating activities, including (a) promotion of women-led small and medium enterprises; (b) microcredit schemes and grants; (c) job creation targeting women; (d) improved access to land and technology; (e) strengthening management skills; (f) women’s networking in cross-border trade; and (g) preferential treatment of women-led firms in government procurement.

91. Women are beneficiaries of non-targeted national programmes, such as rural extension interventions in agricultural and pastoral activities; promotion of small and medium enterprises[42] and entrepreneurial capacity; job creation programmes, including those for youth; vocational training; and labour-intensive public works.

[38] Out of 43 countries for which data are available. The 12 countries are Algeria, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland and Tunisia. United Nations, *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2014*, p. 43.

[39] Out of 36 countries for which data are available. The 8 countries are Algeria, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, Swaziland and Tunisia. Ibid., p. 44.

[40] Liberia, the Central African Republic and Malawi.

[41] United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals Gender Chart*, special edition, March 2014.

[42] Countries that have established special funds to support women enterprises in this category include Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa.

Infrastructure development improves women's access to public transport, electricity, water, roads, sanitation and information and communications technologies, reducing the household care burden and making it more compatible with income-generating activities or better jobs.[43] These require gender targeting.

92. Despite technical and financial assistance, actual allocation of aid from DAC members to support women's economic empowerment as the principal objective represents only 2.3 per cent of total gender-marked ODA for Africa.[44] Increased focus is expected on enhancement of girls' and women's empowerment and their social and economic rights, combined with additional support to capacity development and enhanced access to, and control over, financial and non-financial resources.

Impact

93. The subindex on economic participation and opportunities of the Global Gender Gap Index[45] reached 60 per cent in Africa in 2014, up from 56 per cent in 2006,[46] and is higher in sub-Saharan Africa (69 per cent) than in Northern Africa (40 per cent).[47] Five African countries[48] emerge among the 20 best world performers in women's economic participation. Nine countries[49] have an excellent rating in women's labour force participation,[50] while in eight countries[51] women receive salaries equal to or higher than 75 per cent of their male counterparts; Rwanda has reached wage equality for equal work. However, in many countries women continue to be affected by significant wage gaps, in addition to other discriminatory practices and cultural constraints.

94. With broader access to productive resources, progress has been achieved in women's role in value chains in agriculture, agro-industry, handcrafts, trade and artisanal and small-scale mining, as well as through small and medium enterprises, female cooperatives and women's groups. Development partners provided financial assistance and technical cooperation. Female entrepreneurs' fairs and national federations of women entrepreneurs broaden access to credit, markets, technologies

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[43] It is estimated that improvements in electricity networks in rural South Africa increased women's employment by 10 per cent in five years. World Bank, *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development* (Washington, D.C., 2011), p. 155.

[44] Estimates have been calculated by making use of average values for the period 2013-2014 from the OECD/DAC Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET) database. If we include, in addition to the principal component of ODA, significant activities as well, the percentage of support to women's economic empowerment amounts to approximately14 per cent of total ODA in Africa. This indicates that donors' preferences are directed towards other sectors.

[45] World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2015* (Geneva, 2015).

[46] ECA, "Twenty-year review", para. 17.

[47] This index covers, inter alia, the economic participation gap (the difference between women and men in labour force participation rates) and the remuneration gap (the estimated female-to-male earned income ratio), and a more qualitative indicator that reflects wage equality for similar work.

[48] Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Malawi and Rwanda. World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2015*, table 4.

[49] Burundi, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Ibid.

[50] World Bank, *World Development Report 2012*, box 5.1.

[51] Benin, Burundi, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2015*, table C2.

and capacity development, with the involvement of the private sector, thereby supporting women's employment prospects.[52]

95. Despite encouraging results, significant gaps persist in gender productivity. Female entrepreneurs have smaller-size businesses, facing limited access to productive inputs such as land and credit. The feminization of poverty is prevalent in many countries; African women account for 60 per cent of adults suffering from hunger.

Commitment D.3: support the protection of women and girls from human rights abuses and end any form of gender-based violence, including conflict-related violence and human trafficking

Implementation

96. Many African countries[53] have enacted legislation to protect women against abuse, eliminating discriminatory provisions in existing laws. Several countries introduced legislation to combat female genital mutilation (FGM). In resolutions 67/147 and 69/150 the General Assembly urged Member States to condemn all harmful practices affecting women and girls and to take all necessary measures, especially through educational campaigns, including enacting and enforcing legislation, to prohibit FGM.

97. Twenty countries set up systems to monitor violence against women, with bilateral and multilateral support, and 19 defined a violence prevalence benchmark. Multisectoral initiatives were launched, benefiting from the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence against Women and the Africa UNiTE campaign. Fourteen countries[54] set up shelters (in urban areas) to protect women against intimate partner violence, sexual violence and FGM.

98. Regarding the protection of women in conflict and post-conflict situations, 16 national action plans and three regional plans have been formulated to put Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) into effect. The Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures (ST/SGB/2003/13) and United Nations disciplinary directives for military contingents, police and military observers emphasized the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping and humanitarian work. Those measures have been confirmed with the renewed commitment of the Secretary-General to strictly enforce the zero-tolerance policy in peacekeeping operations, reinforced by the Council in resolution 2242 (2015).

99. Consistent with the focus on the wider human security dimension of the African Union Peace and Security Agenda, the Chair of the African Union Commission appointed a Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security to improve

[52] Women's share of employment in the industrial sector in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 1992 to 2012 from 5.6 to 6.3 per cent and in the service sector from 23.6 to 31.2 per cent, while in North Africa the share was stable in industry but showed a net increase from 48 to 57 per cent in the service sector. International Labour Organization, *Global Employment Trends for Women* (Geneva, 2012).

[53] Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[54] Algeria, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. ECA, "Twenty-year review", para. 64.

women's participation in the mediation and promotion of peace, political processes and conflict prevention. The Special Envoy is developing a continental results framework on women, peace and security in Africa, following a decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council in 2014 recognizing the importance of engaging women in peace processes, conflict prevention and resolution, national reconciliation and post-conflict rehabilitation. The framework will be a tool for monitoring the implementation by member States and other stakeholders of instruments and commitments to this agenda in Africa and the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2242 (2015).

100. ODA for gender equality within peace and security operations has remained low, at an average of $459 million per year, since 2002. International support to end violence against women is a top priority in the 2030 Agenda, confirming an increased focus on human rights by all partners. DAC members are trying to integrate gender equality into their country programmes, but few allocate sufficient funds to fight violence against women;[55] ODA flows for this purpose are very modest.

Impact

101. The implementation of legislation on human rights and its alignment to regional and international standards face delays and complex cultural challenges, especially in rural areas. Discrimination in national legal systems, particularly around family law, marriage (including age requirements), inheritance, ownership of land, control of productive resources and social norms, is prevalent.[56]

102. New laws allow women victims of violence to bring cases to courts, although cultural constraints frequently hinder their access to justice, causing underreporting and limited convictions of perpetrators. Moreover, in 7 sub-Saharan Africa countries, there are no laws on rape, in 17 others, no laws on domestic violence and in 11 countries, no laws on sexual harassment.[57] Although child marriages are decreasing, they still persist in 30 countries. Despite the decline in the incidence of FGM,[58] progress is uneven and FGM still affects millions of women in 29 African countries. In 8 countries, the incidence of FGM is between 88 per cent and 98 per cent and in 5 others, between 66 per cent and 76 per cent.

Overall assessment and key challenges

103. Significant progress was achieved in gender equality and women's empowerment owing to targeted policy and financial support. However, organizational and institutional weaknesses of gender mechanisms, including lack of coordination between ministries and underresourcing, have limited their impact.

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[55] OECD-DAC Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET), "Financing United Nations Security Council resolution 1325: aid in support of gender equality and women's rights in fragile contexts", March 2015, p. 3.

[56] ECA, "Twenty-year review", paras. 102-103.

[57] OECD Development Centre, *Social Institutions and Gender Index 2014 Synthesis Report*, p. 50.

[58] UNICEF, *Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and Exploration of the Dynamics of Change* (New York, 2013). The European Union supports programmes as well as the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting to enhance the African Union's capacity. Senegal, where the number of villages that declared abandonment of these practices increased from 300 to 5,316 between 2008 and 2011, is an example of astonishing progress.

Inadequate involvement of women's organizations in gender-responsive strategic programming and implementation and lack of united local leadership and accountability on gender equality prevail. Reaching the poorest and most marginalized women in Africa is crucial for implementing Sustainable Development Goal 5. Moreover, ODA targeting women's economic empowerment is inadequate.

104. The key challenges are:

(a) Persistence of gender disparities in literacy rates, gaps in secondary and tertiary education,[59] continued prevalence of maternal mortality (Africa accounts for 63 per cent of global maternal deaths) and inadequate capacity development;

(b) Discrimination against women in marriage, inheritance and control over assets/resources, with cultural gender biases leading to weak social acceptability of women's rights to own property; their access to, and control over, land; and their role as autonomous income-earners or their confinement to the informal sector;

(c) Continued violence against women, including conflict-related violence, threatening women's psychological and physical integrity, even after cessation of hostilities, and non-prosecution of perpetuators; FGM is still frequently practised in a few countries;

(d) Persistent cultural and religious barriers to gender equality and women's empowerment;

(e) Inadequate participation by women in peace processes and peacebuilding;

(f) Limited comparable gender-disaggregated data,[60] leading to non-inclusion of gender-equality targets in programming, monitoring and evaluation frameworks;

(g) Inadequate financial, human and organizational support to national gender mechanisms.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

105. **The priority actions suggested below follow from a thorough assessment based on the United Nations monitoring mechanism core principle of mutual accountability and continued rigorous monitoring by the General Assembly. These actions support the implementation of policy frameworks such as the African Union Agenda 2063 (and its first 10-year implementation plan) and the 2030 Agenda, which complement each other on inclusive and people-centred sustainable development.**

106. **The 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 need to build on progress and consider underlying conditions for sustained growth and development. Tackling the pending challenges requires determination, strategic vision and actions, including allocation of adequate and additional domestic and international resources in a harmonized and integrated manner by all stakeholders. Improved monitoring through enhanced data and assessment of results**

[59] ECA, "Twenty-year review", para. 30 and table 2.
[60] Ibid., para. 127.

achieved and challenges encountered will help advance Africa's transformative Agenda 2063.

107. **The recommendations on the four themes of the present report are as follows.**

Infrastructure development

108. **African Governments may consider the need to:**

(a) **Speed up reforms and facilitate local and foreign private sector participation in infrastructure development through enabling regulatory and legal frameworks;**

(b) **Intensify efforts for domestic resource mobilization and access to infrastructure financing, including through innovative sources;**

(c) **Work with regional economic communities, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, AfDB and the private sector to lead and coordinate efforts to expand local and subregional capacity for preparation of bankable projects.**

109. **Africa's development partners may consider the need to:**

(a) **Strive to mobilize additional resources, including through multilateral development banks, for infrastructure, in accordance with their commitments under the Dakar Agenda for Action, the Infrastructure Development Forum and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda;**

(b) **Utilize multilateral institutions to support PIDA, NEPAD, the African Union and RECs towards accelerating infrastructure development;**

(c) **Increase their support for the preparation of bankable projects and implementation capacity in African countries and RECs;**

(d) **Support the implementation of the priority projects of Agenda 2063, particularly those related to infrastructure development, such as the high-speed train and the unified airspace.**

Trade

110. **African Governments may consider the need to:**

(a) **Accelerate the establishment of the continental free trade area by 2017 to boost intra-African trade and to promote regional integration, industrialization and structural transformation;**

(b) **Take a comprehensive approach to trade, including trade finance and trade facilitation measures such as simplified customs practices, freedom of movement and harmonized rules of origin, to further expand intraregional trade;**

(c) **Address investment constraints and engage in cross-regional investment facilitation and promotion efforts;**

(d) **Address supply-side constraints by enhancing productive capacities and reducing constraints on the private sector to help diversify the export base;**

(e) **Support the establishment of small and medium enterprises to ensure the involvement of women and youth in trade.**

111. **Africa's development partners may consider the need to:**

(a) **Coordinate, bilaterally and multilaterally, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of trade-related technical assistance, reducing trade costs and focusing on a value-chain perspective for African least developed countries;**

(b) **Enhance the transparency of procedural and regulatory requirements that may act as non-tariff barriers to African exporters and provide African countries with assistance targeted to overcome their relatively higher cost of compliance with non-tariff measures;**

(c) **Intensify their support for building Africa's productive capacity and services and industrial sectors to underpin Africa's structural transformation and enhance employment;**

(d) **Strive to dismantle restrictive trade measures imposed since the financial crisis of 2008 and refrain from adding new trade restrictions;**

(e) **Support the development, transfer and dissemination of environmentally sound technologies to African countries on favourable terms, to help Africa improve its trade capacity and export diversification towards products with a higher technological content in a sustainable manner;**

(f) **Support African countries' reform efforts relating to international investment agreements and associated regional integration initiatives.**

Achieving a conflict-free Africa

112. **African Governments may consider the need to:**

(a) **Support African Union peace operations by further strengthening APSA, ensuring that all subregional standby forces are fully operational, and achieve the African Union goal of contributing 25 per cent of the cost of African Union-led peace operations;**

(b) **Address the root causes of conflict and violent extremism, including high poverty and unemployment and marginalization due to economic and political exclusion;**

(c) **Support the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy; strengthen regional cooperation, including intelligence and information sharing on suspected arms traffickers, trafficking routes and suspected diversion activities across porous African borders; and ratify or accede to the African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (Niamey Convention);**

(d) **Strengthen institutional capacities to curb illicit trade in natural resources and to end all forms of illicit financial flows from Africa.**

113. **Africa's development partners may consider the need to:**

(a) **Strengthen the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, including predictable funding for joint initiatives in early warning, peacekeeping and peacebuilding;**

(b) **Sustain assistance for African Union peace operations and training of peacekeepers and law enforcement and security agencies;**

(c) **Support the African Union to enhance its capacity for preventive diplomacy and strengthen the African Peer Review Mechanism financially and logistically to improve governance;**

(d) **Support African efforts in addressing the root causes of conflict and violent extremism through economic and financial assistance, intelligence sharing and creating youth employment;**

(e) **Support the decision of the African Union by fully implementing the recommendations of the High-level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, providing financial and training support to African countries in monitoring, detecting and preventing illicit financial flows;**

(f) **Increase financial contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund and to African countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission;**

(g) **Support the involvement of women and youth in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.**

Gender equality and women's empowerment

114. **African Governments may consider the need to:**

(a) **Implement strategies and legislation for women's empowerment, enhance their political and economic participation, promote respect for human rights and freedoms and introduce necessary reforms in laws relating to the family and violence against women, in line with the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063, while pursuing, inter alia, peace and security, efficient governance, rule of law and sustainable institution building;**

(b) **Adopt reforms to improve women's economic rights, including access and control over means of production, land, property, finance, inheritance and adequate employment opportunities, increasing the allocation of resources for gender-targeted actions, mainstreaming a gender perspective in development policies and adopting gender-responsive budgeting;**

(c) **Ensure adequate financial support to budgets of national gender mechanisms and ministries and engage key national institutions to integrate women's rights across all arms of government;**

(d) **Support women's movements and organizations in Africa and encourage their involvement in formulating and implementing a gender agenda, ensuring coordination and accountability, with broad participation of stakeholders, including civil society organizations and the private sector.**

115. **Africa's development partners may consider the need to:**

(a) **Financially support African countries in their efforts to achieve gender equality and women's empowerment through gender-targeted interventions and mainstreaming gender in their cooperation programmes, including by supporting women's organizations;**

(b) **Prioritize in their international cooperation areas such as women's economic empowerment, protection of women from human rights abuses and ending violence against women;**

(c) **Target gender equality and women's participation within peace and security operations in conflict and post-conflict situations;**

(d) **Support African Union efforts to improve gender-disaggregated data at the national and local levels, establishing databases and information systems such as the African Union Gender Scorecard;**

(e) **Support African Union efforts in the field of women, peace and security, including the activities of the Special Envoy of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security and other activities of the African Union Directorate of Women, Gender and Development.**

116. **The United Nations and the African Union should work together to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and its follow-up, ensuring adequate coordination between the gender equality agenda and peace and security efforts.**